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Summary 
In this master’s thesis the nearly unexamined topic of the civil liability of banks vis-à-
vis their customers for improper application of anti-money laundering measures in the 
Latvian perspective is explored. The findings and conclusions of this thesis will be 
relevant in Latvia from both the point of view of theoretical analysis and practical 
applicability.   
In the course of the research the concept of money laundering and the important role of 
banks in combating the money laundering is reviewed. In doing so the different types of 
the banks’ anti-money laundering obligations are regarded. The thesis follows with the 
research of the banks’ civil liability if they have failed to properly enforce the anti-
money laundering measures and by doing so have caused losses to their customers. 
Forth, the principle of exemption of the banks’ liability and its borders are researched in 
the light of the principle of good faith. In the last chapter of the thesis the distribution of 
burden of proof in the customers’ claims against the banks is analysed distinguishing 
between different categories of the customers of banks. 
It is concluded in the thesis that if the banks fail to acquire sufficient evidence to 
substantiate their suspicion regarding the customers’ involvement in money laundering 
they risk being held liable for improper application of the law towards their customers. 
It is further concluded that although the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing only lists specific circumstances that allow the aggrieved 
customers to claim compensation for losses it does not limit any other potential claims 
not explicitly covered by that regulation. It is argued that application of the restrictive 
anti-money laundering measures must be reasonably assessed by the banks. 
Enforcement of these measures must not be arbitrary, and they must be justified by 
sufficient evidence and rooted in a diligent application of the regulation. It is also 
concluded that the burden of proof lies with the banks to show that they have properly 
applied the restrictive anti-money laundering measures. Lastly, a conclusion is made 
that the credibility of evidence for proving the good faith and suspicions of the bank 
varies depending on the status of the counter party in the transaction with the bank. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The profits generated by organised crime are enormous. Based on a study by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and and Crime, profits were estimated to be between 2% to 
5%
1
 (that is, $800 billion to $2 trillion) of global GDP.   
Money laundering (hereafter – “ML”) is the process of disguising the unlawful source 
of criminally derived proceeds to make them appear legal. It is the lifeline and the 
driving force of the organised criminal industry. ML can have negative effects, 
economically, socially and politically, both in the short term and long run. There have 
been various attempts on a national, supranational and international level to combat ML 
by adopting anti-money laundering (hereafter – “AML”) legislation and introducing 
new AML measures. 
The banking system plays a crucial role helping prevent preventing ML. ML would be 
largely impossible without the network of banks and other financial institutions that 
facilitate it. As a consequence, the financial and related sectors have always been 
positioned at the forefront of the drive to combat ML. Because of the money launderers’ 
need to dispose of cash, deposit-taking institutions are particularly vulnerable to risks of 
ML. Both international and national AML regulations impose various strict obligations 
on the banks, including customer due diligence, verification of clients’ beneficial 
owners, reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions, and refraining from execution 
of transactions. The law also allows banks to terminate legal relationships and close 
clients’ accounts with persons and entities considered representing a high ML risk.  
The issue of ML in Latvian banks has come to the fore in recent years. A number of 
Latvian banks have faced fines amounting to millions imposed by the supervisor for 
failing to properly implement AML measures. In the spring of 2018, liquidation of the 
third largest Latvian bank ABLV was initiated following the decision of the US 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to prohibit the opening or 
maintaining of a correspondent accounts in the United States for or on behalf of ABLV 
Bank.  FinCEN made this recommendation based on its finding that “ABLV is a foreign 
bank of primary money laundering concern”2.  
Increasing AML obligations and potential fines have inevitably led to stricter imposition 
of the AML measures on the banks’ customers. This would have been completely 
acceptable had AML laws and regulations been properly applied by the banks. 
However, an issue arises if the banks if the banks start applying the restrictive AML 
measures vis-à-vis their customers formally and imprudently, thereby harming both the 
customers suspected of ML and customers free of unlawful activity. In this context, the 
potential civil liability of the banks towards the customers against whom the restrictive 
measures have been improperly imposed becomes relevant. 
                                                          
1
 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Money-Laundering and Globalization”, Available on: 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html, Accessed 17 April 2018. 
2
 FinCEN press release. Available online - https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-names-
ablv-bank-latvia-institution-primary-money-laundering-concern-and. Accessed 3 May 2018. 
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Although the problematic issue of legal remedies of customers for the banks’ improper 
application of the AML/CTF regulation was touched upon about a decade ago by the 
Constitution Court of Latvia
3
, the topic is still nearly unexamined by the Latvian legal 
authors. A few authors have indicated some deficiencies of selected aspects of the 
legislation, but without a further research of the matter
4
.  
The AML regulation prescribes that financial institutions generally be exempted from 
civil legal liability when applying AML regulations vis-à-vis their customers, i.e. 
customers do not have legal remedies against banks that have enforced AML 
regulations in good faith. It is widely accepted that this exemption has a highly broad 
scope ensuring that they are not discouraged to apply the AML obligations due to 
potential claims of their customers. If banks have in good faith refrained from executing 
customers’ payment orders (frozen the customers’ accounts) and reported this to the 
authorities, then the losses to the customers are compensated from the state budget. 
However, this regulation is vague and ambiguous and remains silent on the issue of 
whether the banks’ customers have remedies for other losses caused to them due to 
improper application of the AML regulation. 
In this master’s thesis, firstly, the concept of ML and the role and obligations of the 
banks will be assessed. Secondly, to what extent banks are liable to their customer for 
improperly applying restrictive AML measures. Thirdly, the principle of exemption of 
civil liability will be researched. The focus will be on analysing the limits of this 
exemption in Latvia and what potential remedies the clients have. And fourthly, the 
evidence required by banks for the exemption to apply.  
The author is not aware of civil disputes in Latvian courts concerning customer claims 
against the banks for improper application of AML measures. However, courts in other 
countries have reviewed similar disputes. This court practice will be reviewed in the 
thesis also providing an assessment if and to what extent those finding would be 
relevant in the disputes before the Latvian court.   
The hypothesis of the thesis is that banks may have civil liability vis-à-vis their 
customers if the banks fail to properly apply the restrictive AML measures and the 
potential remedies of customers go beyond the framework set by the Law on the 
Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
5
 (hereafter – the „AML/CTF 
Law”). The research question of the thesis is to determine whether restrictive AML 
measures applied by the banks towards their customers are arbitrary
6
 or whether they 
                                                          
3
 Judgment of 28  May, 2009, case No.2008-47-01, Constitutional Court of Latvia, section 15.9. 
Available online: http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2008-47-01_Spriedums.pdf. 
Accessed 31 March 2018 
4
 E.g., see See. Agneta Rumpa „Banku loma noziedzīgu līdzekļu legalizācijas un terorisma finansēšanas 
novēršanā” (The Reole of Banks in Anti-money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing), Jurista 
Vārds, 27.09.2016., Nr. 39 (942), pp. 12-18., Aldis Alliks, „Naudas “atmazgāšanas” novēršana bankās – 
starp tiesiskuma un populisma dzirnām”, Jurista Vārds, 17 May, 2016, No. 20 (923), pp.13.-15.   
5
 Noziedzīgi iegūtu līdzekļu legalizācijas un terorisma finansēšanas novēršanas likums (Law on the 
Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing): Latvijas Republikas likums, Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 2008, 28.augusts, nr.116. 
6
For the purspose of this thesis the arbitrary conduct corresponds to the definition of an arbitrary judicial 
decision provided in the Black’s Law Dictionary: a conduct “founded on prejudice or preference rather 
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need to be based on objective evidence for the exemption of liability to apply. The 
question of whether the level of necessary evidence may vary from different types bank 
customers will also be reviewed. 
A comment needs to be made here regarding the counter-terrorism financing (hereafter 
– “CTF”) measures aimed at combating the illicit funding of terrorism. The CTF 
regulation is universally regarded alongside the AML regulation7. However, for the 
matter of simplicity the focus of this thesis shall be on ML. Still, considering that banks 
obligations within the framework of application of the restrictive measures towards their 
customers are almost identical for both types of illegal activity, the findings and 
conclusions of the thesis apply both in respect of AML and CTF measures. 
It also needs to be pointed out that the liability of the banks is explored in the thesis as 
they have the highest impact of all the subjects of the AML/CTF Law. They are also 
significantly more often apply the restrictive AML measures against their customers and 
therefore are also more exposed to causing losses to their customers and hence exposing 
themselves to a potential liability. However, most of the findings of this thesis may also 
in certain circumstances be applicable to subjects of the AML regulation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
than on reason or fact”. Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Garner, Bryan A., and Henry Campbell 
Black. Black's Law Dictionary. 9th ed. St. Paul, MN: West, 2009, p.119. 
7
 Money laundering presupposes an illegitimate source of funds whilst the financing of terrorism entails 
the illegitimate use of funds, both adopt techniques in using financial institutions to ‘layer’ (i.e. disguise 
the origin and destination of) money” 
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2. MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE ROLE OF BANKS 
In this Chapter of the thesis, the notion of the ML shall be explored reviewing its 
negative effects. The central role of the banks in the combating ML are, assessed along 
with the primary obligations of the banks in the AML field. In the light of the thesis, the 
most relevant issues are those AML obligations of the banks that may cause losses to 
their customers that they might seek compensations for. 
2.1 The Definition and effects of money laundering 
Although there are slightly different definitions of ML used, generally it is defined as a 
deliberate concealment or disguise of the illicit origin of money transactions, securities 
transactions or other income, which proceed from criminal activities.
8
 ML is the process 
of disguising the unlawful source of criminally derived proceeds to make them appear 
legal. The origin of the term is unclear: some point to the literal meaning of the 
expression whilst other point to the use of the laundromats of organised crime in the 
United States during the Prohibition Era to integrate the proceeds of their crimes into 
the legitimate economy
9
. In this thesis the term of “money laundering” will be used over 
the less popular term “legalization of the proceeds of crime” - though they both mean 
the same thing. 
The need to use the proceeds of crime generates the need to launder money thus freeing 
the assets from their illegal origin. Illegal producers and traders are forced to launder 
their illicit assets, i.e. to inject them into legal economic and financial market, at the 
same time concealing their true origin
10
. There are three main reasons to launder money: 
a) Firstly, ML is the lifeline and the driving force behind organised crime.
11
 b) 
Secondly, it would be unwise to receive money directly from the illegal activities and 
directly invest it as law enforcement could easily trace the origin of those funds.  And c) 
thirdly, the proceeds of crime can be targeted by confiscation or seizure
12
. 
The process of ML is typically analysed in the three following stages: 
a) Placement. The first is the “placement” stage when the proceeds of the crime are 
“placed” into the financial system, e.g., being deposited into the banking or retail 
economy
13
; 
                                                          
8
 Cornelia Gerster, Germaine Klein, Henning Schoppmann, David Schwander and Christoph Wengler, 
European Banking and Financial Services Law (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), p.179. 
9
 Eva Lomnicka , „Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”, in Ellinger’s Modern Banking 
Law. Fifth edition, ed. E.P. Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C.V.M. Hare (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.92. 
10
 Клаус Коттке, Грязные" деньги - что это такое? Справочник по налоговому законодательству 
в области "грязных" денег. Изданиэ 7-е (“Dirty” money – what is it? Guidebook on tax law in the area 
of “dirty” money) (Москва: Дело и Сервис, 1998), с. 15. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Harry Dixon, „Maintaining Individual Liability in AML and Cybersecurity at New York's Financial 
Institutions”, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (April 2017), p.85. 
13
 Eva Lomnicka, „Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”, in Ellinger’s Modern Banking 
Law. Fifth edition, ed. E.P. Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C.V.M. Hare (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.92. 
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b) Layering. The second is the “layering” stage in which there is the first attempt at 
concealment by disguising the source of the ownership of the funds
14
.At this stage the 
proceeds are moved, usually through series of wire transactions or other transactions 
designed to place a further distance between the funds and their criminal origins, thus 
obscuring any audit trail
15
. Cross border transactions – using offshore centres with laws 
protecting the secrecy of financial transactions – are a common feature of the layering 
process
16
. 
c) Integration. The third stage is “integration”, when the criminal resumes control of the 
proceeds, free from any link to their criminal source.
17
 Establishing companies to invest 
in real estate, shares, or other assets may do this
18
. The most common way of ML is to 
hide it through apparently legitimate commercial transactions
19
. Thus, the proceeds of 
crime return to a legal market by way of investment
20
. 
The costs of ML are so significant that the legislators of the European Union (hereafter 
– “EU”) have stated, “massive flows of dirty money can damage the stability and 
reputation of the financial sector and threaten the single market”21. However, the direct 
effect of ML is sometimes questioned. ML usually does not have direct victims; it can 
even be considered a “victimless crime”22. 
ML can have various negative effects - economic, social and political. The economic 
effects, for instance, concern unfair competition between honest and dishonest 
businesses, distortion of prices, negative effects on investments, and the marginalisation 
of legitimate and transparent businesses. In the short-term ML distorts prices, rates of 
consumption, savings and investment, increases import/export volatility, the demand for 
money and interest and exchange rates; and it alters the availability of credit. Therefore, 
in the short run, ML therefore negatively impacts the operation of a legitimate 
economy
23”. 
                                                          
14
 William C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures. Second 
edition (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999), p. 29. 
15
 Charles Proctor, The Law and Practice of International Banking, (Oxford: Oxform University press, 
2010), p.144. 
16
 Eva Lomnicka, „Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”, in Ellinger’s Modern Banking 
Law. Fifth edition, ed. E.P. Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C.V.M. Hare (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.92. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Charles Proctor, The Law and Practice of International Banking (Oxford: Oxform University press, 
2010), p.144. 
19
 Prince Michael von und zu Liechtenstein, „Money Laundering and small states: the practical 
experience of Liechstenstein”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and 
Daan van der Linde, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 145. 
20
 Клаус Коттке, "Грязные" деньги - что это такое? Справочник по налоговому законодательству 
в области "грязных" денег. Изданиэ 7-е (Москва: Дело и Сервиц, 1998), с. 15. 
21
 Recital 1 of the Preamble of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
No.2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering and terrorist financing. 
22
 Brigitte Unger, „Introduction”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and 
Daan van der Linde (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.5. 
23
 Killian J. McCarthy, „Why do some states tolerate money laundering. On the competition of illegal 
money”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and Daan van der Linde, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.130. 
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On the other hand, in the long-term ML endangers the survival of the host countries’ 
financial sector – not only because of the risks it poses in terms of stability and 
liquidity, but also in terms of reputation and profitability. This, in turn, threatens the 
continuance of foreign direct investment flows in the country and denies it an 
instrument of growth
24
. Depriving potential launderers of access to financial markets 
helps those markets maintain a reputation for integrity which enhances their stability 
and hence attractiveness. 
The social effects of ML concern increase of corruption and bribery. Laundering needs 
helpers and facilitators, stimulating an increasing number of people to be drawn into 
criminality. Political effects include undermining democratic systems
25
. ML also plays 
the role of multiplier for crime, corruption, bribery and terrorism, which at its worst can 
undermine both the democratic institutions and the foreign policy objectives of its 
people
26
.
 
In the long run ML can be seen to pose an existential threat to the fundaments 
of a country. Thus, the author agrees with the opinion that dealing with ML and 
confiscation of criminal assets is not only a key indicator of success in terms of 
protecting national economies, but it “should also be seen in terms of enforcement of 
the rule of law”27.    
In the majority of developed countries judicial authorities find it very hard both to 
detect ML transactions and to convict the guilty persons.
28
 The key problem in 
measuring ML lies with its non-observational character, as is the case for some other 
economic variables such as the underground economy and home production.
29
 
In respect of the financial sector ML can cause the failure of banks and financial 
institutions. For instance, if a large sum of money is transferred to a bank and then, 
shortly thereafter, that money is then transferred to another bank-- liquidity may be a 
problem to the bank’s financial assets. The bank can go bankrupt if a large number of 
people begin withdrawing their deposits upon learning that large amounts of money 
have been moved from that bank by money launderers
30
. Furthermore, ML also cripples 
the reputation of the financial institutions. 
Even though international pressure is strong on countries to combat ML, there are 
significant incentives for the government of an open economy to tolerate it. As the ML 
                                                          
I
Ibid.. 
25
 Brigitte Unger, „Introduction”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and 
Daan van der Linde, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.4. 
26
 Killian J. McCarthy, „Why do some states tolerate money laundering. On the competition of illegal 
money”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and Daan van der Linde, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.130. 
27
 Cf. Ladislav Hamran, „Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime: a Challenge from Criminal Justice”, in 
Democracy and Rule of Law in the European Union, ed. Flora A.N.J. Goudappel, Ernst M.H. Hirsch 
Ballin, (Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), p.174. 
28
 Michelle Bagella, Francesco Busato and Amedo Argentiero, „Using Dynamic Macroeconomics For 
Estimating Money Laundering: a Simulation for the EU, Italy and the United States”, in Research 
Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and Daan van der Linde, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.7. 
29
 Ibid.,p.8. 
30
 Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, “An Overview of Money Laundering in Pakistan and Worldwide: Causes, 
Methods, and Socioeconomic Effects”, 2 U. Bologna L. Rev., 300 (2017) pp. 316-317, (pp.300-345). 
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industry offers money launderers high profits at low cost, the temptations are high for 
those in-the-know in the developed world to engage in ML
31
. In a closed economy, the 
state is forced to “internalise” the total costs of crime. As a result, the state suffers the 
negative consequences of crime. Accordingly, crime prevention is a political priority. 
And financial transparency – as a tool for tackling crime – is set at a higher level. 
However, in an open economy the illegal business of creating criminal profits can be 
done “in one part of the world, while the “odour-less” profits that it creates can be 
transferred to invest somewhere else”32. 
Governments in the developed world might be tempted to permit lowering the standards 
of AML to attract criminal investment flows from other countries where the criminal 
offense providing the proceeds of the crime took place. While developed countries 
tackle crime in their own jurisdictions, they have few levers to combat crime – and in 
the process reduce the profitability – in other jurisdictions33. Thus, a necessity for a 
strong and clear international AML regulation and guidance preventing the offenders 
from reaping the fruits of the crime is highlighted.
34
 Economic globalisation requires 
ever developing supranational legal rules, as national regulation is often unable to 
respond with sufficient celerity to new stimuli represented by the globalisation 
process
35
. 
With respect to the financial sector, the possibility of earning significant profits is 
powerful and can serve as a strong motivation for financial institutions to knowingly 
violate the law. The relationship with money launderers is “so lucrative that some 
financial institutions who know they are violating the law and continue to do so”36. At 
the same time, banks are at the forefront in combating ML and are tasked with not 
allowing their illicit funds to enter the financial system. In the following sub-chapter, 
the role of the banks and the financial sector will be reviewed in light of AML 
regulations. 
2.2 Role of the banks and financial institutions 
All economies are substantially dependent on the integrity of their financial sector. ML 
activities may endanger the integrity of a financial centre and thus the economy as a 
                                                          
31
 Killian J. McCarthy, „Why do some states tolerate money laundering. On the competition of illegal 
money”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and Daan van der Linde, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.130. 
32
 
I
Ibid., p.134. 
33
 Killian J. McCarthy, „Why do some states tolerate money laundering. On the competition of illegal 
money”, in Research Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and Daan van der Linde, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p.137. 
34
 Elena Madalina Busuioc, „Defining Money Laundering”, in The Scale and Impacts of Money 
Laundering, Brigitte Unger (with a contribution of Elena Madalina Busuioc), (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2007), p.15.,  
35
 Alexander J. Bělohlávek, „Regulation of Financial Markets and Money Laundering: Contemporary 
Trends in European and International Cooperation”, Czech yearbook of international law : Vol. IV 
(2013). New York: Juris Publishing, 2013. p. 96. 
36
 Joel Slawotsky, “Are financial institutions liable for financial crime under the alien tort statute”,  
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, n. 15(4), 2013, p. 975. 
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whole
37
. The soundness, integrity and stability of credit and financial institutions and 
confidence in the financial system could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of 
criminals and their associates either to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to 
channel illicit money
38
. 
As money launderers need to rid themselves of their illicit funds and cash, deposit-
taking institutions are particularly vulnerable to being manipulated. Hence, many of the 
efforts to combat ML are concentrated on the procedure adopted by deposit-takers
39
.  
However, in Latvia the free flow of assets seems to be an even more topical issue. 
Without the network of banks and other financial institutions to facilitate all the three 
stages of ML and to provide respectability to the proceeds when they eventually 
reappear, ML would be largely impossible
40
. In the context of the internal market, 
financial flows are integrated and cross-border by nature, and money can flow swiftly, if 
not instantly, from one EU Member State to another
41
, allowing criminals to move 
funds across countries while avoiding detection by authorities thus abusing the internal 
market of EU
42
.  
Financial and related sectors have always been positioned at the forefront and the 
outpost in combating ML.  Therefore, it is now generally accepted that banks should be 
active participants in the fight against ML. For legal, reputational, and many other 
reasons, banks are now vigilant so as to prevent the use of their services and facilities as 
a means of laundering or transferring the proceeds of crime
43
. 
The banking industry recognizes that the existing threat of ML and terrorist financing is 
real and thus requires the coordinated efforts of all parties. Accordingly, the industry 
continues to support any initiatives in place to improve the efficiency of the existing 
AML regime and recognizes that the regime needs to be occasionally reviewed and 
adapted to new trends and methods (typologies), technological developments and, in 
particular, new threats.
44
 The costs associated with the due diligence of implementation, 
monitoring, and reporting under the AML laws will likely reduce the profits of strong 
                                                          
37
 Ewald Nowotny, „The role of small states for financial market integrity: Austria”, in Research 
Handbook on Money Laundering, ed. Brigette Unger and Daan van der Linde, (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 148. 
38
 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, 
preamble recital 2, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005. Available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32005L0060. Accessed September 23, 2017. 
39
 William C. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures. Second 
edition, (Strasbourg : Council of Europe Publishing, 1999), p. 31. 
40
 Eva Lomnicka , „Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”, in Ellinger’s Modern Banking 
Law. Fifth edition, ed. E.P. Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C.V.M. Hare (New York : Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.92.the Basel Committee’s Report on Customer Due Diligence (2001). 
41
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the assessment of the risks 
of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border 
activities, p. 2, Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45319, Accessed 17 
April 2018. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Charles Proctor, The Law and Practice of International Banking, (Oxford: Oxform University press, 
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financial institutions and may even drive smaller financial institutions out of business. 
ML is not a static activity. Those serious about winning this fight must continually 
adjust to an ever-changing environment
45
. 
The potential bank profits in dealing with non-residents increases the risks of being 
involved in ML. Banks serving Latvian non-resident are particularly exposed. In the 
Latvian National ML/Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Report, the high-risk 
appetite for transactions involving foreign customers has exposed Latvian to increased 
ML/TF risks. The risk in the sector of foreign customer serving banks has been named 
as the number one factor in the vulnerability of the financial sector
46
.
47
  
To mitigate the risk appetite in unmanageable proportions and combat ML in general, 
the banks are tasked with specific obligations, examined in the next sub-Chapter. 
2.3 Primary AML duties of the banks 
Both the international and national legislation provide for specific obligations of the 
banks in provision of their services to a certain extent prevent situations that their 
customers would engage in ML/TF activities. Some authors have even named the 
banking sector a “private police” in performance of the AML obligations48. 
At the international level, the main AML guidance body is the Financial Action Task 
Force (hereafter – “FATF”)49. The competence of the FATF is specifically directed 
towards the fight against ML and terrorism financing in a global environment.
50
 In 1990 
the FATF adopted “the 40 Recommendations” on combating ML which set standards 
that governments are expected to meet, with a special emphasis on the critical role that 
the financial sector has to play.
51
 In May, 2002, FATF issued a Consultation paper, 
Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations, seeking to comment on proposed changes 
in the Forty Regulations.  The measures would generally put more obligations to adopt 
Know Your Customer policies and enhance suspicious transaction reporting. It also 
discusses the application of the standards to a broad range of financial institutions.
52
 
                                                          
45
 Michael J. Anderson and Tracey A. Anderson, “Anti-money laundering: history and current 
developments”, Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 30(10) (2015), p.531. 
46
 Latvian National money laundering/terrorism financing risk assessment report, Riga, 27 April 2017, 
p.7, Avaialble at: http://www.kd.gov.lv/images/Downloads/useful/ML_TF_ENG_FINAL.pdf, Accessed 
12 April 2018 
47
 The other important factors include a) Insufficient independence of the AML/CTF system due to 
serious deficiencies in the organizational structure c) insufficient competence of the banks’ personell and 
deficiencies in the field of security of the personal liability; d) improper IT systems in the management of 
ML/TF risks. 
48
 E.g. see Lloyd Himaambo, “Role of Banks as Private Police in the Anti-Money Laundering Crusade”, 9 
Bocconi Legal Papers (2017):pp.157 – 186. 
49
 Douglas W. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p.  190 
50
 Charles Proctor, The Law and Practice of International Banking, (Oxford: Oxform University press, 
2010), p.145. 
51
 Eva Lomnicka, „Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism”, in Ellinger’s Modern Banking 
Law. Fifth edition, ed. E.P. Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and C.V.M. Hare (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p.94 
52
 Hal S. Scott and Philip A. Wellons, International Finance. Transactions, Policy, and Regulation. Ninth 
edition (New York: Foundation Press, 2002), p.1392. 
14 
  
 
 
The FATF identified a series of measures that financial institutions must take on the 
basis of national legislation to prevent ML. These measures, known as “preventive 
measures”, have been designed by the FATF to protect financial institutions from abuse 
and help them to adopt adequate controls and procedures
53
. 
Reinforcement of the risk-based approach is the general and underlying principle of all 
AML systems. Contrary to the rule based approach the risk-based approach requires that 
existing risks are well understood and that relevant measures are calibrated 
accordingly.
54
 This means that financial institutions are expected to understand, 
identify, and assess their risks, take appropriate actions to mitigate them, and allocate 
resources efficiently by focusing on top risk areas.
55
 The current regime is predicated on 
the measurement and management of risk, by means of risk assessments, and the 
subsequent shaping of the required customer due diligence measures.
56
 
The AML rules have also been harmonized on the EU level in four so called “AML 
Directives” with the fifth being in development. Since the first attempts to harmonize 
the AML regulation in the EU money laundering countermeasures have developed 
substantially, and always in parallel with international developments, in particular 
initiatives of the FATF
57
. 
The increasing sophistication of the ML schemes and the inability of the prosecution to 
set aside sufficient resources to investigate into such constructions caused legislators to 
take a step to burden financial institutions with investigative duties
58
. Although the EU 
does not have a criminal law competence, its powers under the provisions on the co-
operation in police and criminal justice affairs nonetheless allow for effective action.
59
 
On the Latvian national level, the banks (credit institutions) are subjects of the 
AML/CTF Law pursuant to Article 3 (1) (1) of the Law. The AML/CTF Law, in which 
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both the requirements under the FATF recommendations and the EU AML directives 
are transposed, prescribes certain AML obligations of the banks.  
The primary obligations of the banks under the AML regulation are briefly reviewed 
below. Although they are all important in relation to the banks’ potential liability vis-a-
vis their customers, the most relevant are the restrictive AML measures imposed by 
banks on their customers and which may cause them losses – the refraining from 
transactions (freezing of the customers’ assets and not making the transfer) and the 
termination of the legal relationship with the customers. 
2.3.1 Termination of the customer relationship 
Article 28 (2) of the AML/CTF Law provides that if the subject of the Law has not 
received true information and documents in the amount necessary for the compliance 
with the customer due diligence enabling it to perform a compliance check, the banks 
shall end the business relationship with the customer and request the early fulfilment of 
obligations from the customer. The banks must exclude those customers who intend to 
use the financial system to launder money, as well as those customers whose ML risk 
cannot be mitigated appropriately
60
. This will especially happen where the fees that can 
be raised when they are retained as clients do not justify the risk mitigation measures in 
relation to such clients
61
. 
This so called “de-risking” may take many forms. Three elements are particularly 
common: first, the closure of (or refusal to open) bank accounts for certain individuals 
and firms, and other restrictions on access to financial services; second, the withdrawal 
or restriction of banking services from money transfer organizations and other 
remittances facilities; and third, the severing of correspondent banking relationships, 
which can entail the loss of access to international payments clearing system
62
. The loss 
of correspondent banking relationships is potentially highly destructive as it entails 
possible systemic effects within the affected economy and could lead to a less efficient 
international payments system
63
. 
Higher ML risk leads to higher exposition of the operators in these sectors to de-risking 
- termination of the relationship by the banks. The following sectors have been 
indicated as significantly and highly significantly exposed to ML/TF risks on the EU 
level in the supra-national risk assessment of the risks of ML and TF
64
: 
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 Electronic money operators65 
 Money value transfer services (i.e. money remittances)66 
 Safe custody services67 
 Crowdfunding platforms and virtual currencies 
 Land-based betting and poker 
 Online gambling68 
 Designated non-financial businesses and professions69 
 Non-profit organisations70 
 Real estate sector71 
 Sectors offering similar facilities to cash (gold, diamonds) or high-value, easily 
tradable “lifestyle” goods, (e.g. cultural artefacts, cars, jewellery, watches)72. 
Recently the value of foreign customer deposits in Latvia significantly decreased by 
almost one-third EUR 3.3 bln.293
73. Thus, there is a tendency to lower the banks’ 
amount of highly risky customers and this tendency is expected to continue. The named 
operators in these more risky sectors and non-residents are consequently more likely to 
try claiming legal remedies against the banks for improper termination (refusal) of legal 
relationship.     
2.3.2 Refraining from executing the transaction 
Pursuant to Article 32 (1) of the AML/CTF Law the banks have the obligation to refrain 
from executing a transaction if it is related with or if there are substantiated suspicions 
related to ML. As stated by the Constitutional Court of Latvia, refraining from 
executing such transactions is a temporary measure that ensures that funds of which 
there are reasonable suspicions that they have illicit origin do not come into possession 
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of such persons that could use them for illegal purposes and that these funds are not 
laundered while the authorities assess the situation
74
. 
When refraining from executing a transaction, the banks must not carry out any actions 
with the funds involved in the transaction until such time when an order of the Office 
for the Prevention of the Laundering of the Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity 
(Financial Intelligence Unit) (hereafter – the “FIU”) is received to terminate refraining 
from executing a transaction
75
. Essentially, during that time, the customers cannot 
exercise their ownership over the funds. Furthermore, following the order of the FIU 
regarding freezing of funds, the banks must ensure freezing of funds without delay until 
the date indicted in the order or until the time when the order of the FIU to terminate 
freezing of funds is received. After the enforcement of the freezing order, the banks are 
obligated to notify the customer in writing regarding the order of the FIU send a copy of 
the order of the FIU to the customer where the procedures for the disputing thereof are 
explained
76
.  
Some Latvian authors have argued that the length period for freezing the assets in the 
instances when the banks’ suspicions are unfounded (most of cases) is a 
„disproportionate limitation of the rights to property”77. The author considers that in the 
light of the important legitimate aim of preventing the ML, if an effective system for 
legal remedies for private individuals is in place the length of limitation is proportional.  
As has been confirmed by Latvian court practice, banks upon adoption of a decision to 
refrain from pursuing the transaction in the customers’ accounts do not perform a public 
function. In these situations, the banks follow their obligations imposed under public 
law. However, it does not mean that public administrative tasks would be bestowed on 
them
78
. Thus, relationship between the banks and their clients remains a private legal 
relationship and any potential infringement of such relationship must be regarded within 
the framework of civil law.  
2.3.3 Customer due diligence 
To ensure that financial institutions can detect potential ML schemes, there are several 
legal requirements, which culminate in the customer due diligence procedure, often 
referred to as Know Your Customer (or more precisely: Counterpart).
79
 Although 95-
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99% of the banks’ customers not related to ML/TF the banks must be able to identify 
the seemingly negligible 1-5% who represent such risk
80
. 
Customer due diligence processes must be designed to help banks understand who their 
customers are by requiring them to gather information on what they do and why they 
require banking services
81
. The 4
th
 AML directive emphasises the so-called risk-based 
approach. This means that customers can be treated differently, depending on their risk 
categorisation
82
. 
Already at the start of a possible customer relationship, a financial institution must take 
measures to identify and verify the customers’ identity and to understand the customers’ 
circumstances and business
83
. Banks must know their customers and their businesses to 
decide whether their customers are engaged in suspicious or illegal activities.
84
 
Customer due diligence consists of two phases. The first phase starts before entering 
into a business relationship
85
. Credit institutions are obliged to require proof of identity 
of their customers when entering into business relationship (e.g. opening of accounts).
86
 
A common technique for criminals is to create shell companies, trusts or complicated 
corporate structures to hide their identities. In such cases, while the funds involved may 
be clearly identified, the beneficial owner remains unknown
87
. Therefore, to comply 
with customer due diligence standards, the bank must perform adequate checks, not just 
of the customer, but also of the persons standing behind the customer, meaning that they 
have to verify the identity of any beneficial owner.
88
 
The Supervisory institution of the Latvian banks, the Financial and Capital Market 
Commission (hereafter – the „FCMC”) has provided in its regulation that in the client 
risk assessment the Latvian banks must assess at least the following client-risk 
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segments: a) the client risk; b) country and geographic risk of the customer; c) the 
services and the product risk; and d) services and product channel risk
89
. The 
Regulation of the FCMC provides for the minimum standards in relation to customer 
due diligence and transaction monitoring. The detailed measures must be provided in 
the internal procedures of the banks. It is important that the regulation provides for a 
burden of proof to ensure that the banks are able to prove that the due diligence 
measures taken by the bank correspond to the risk related to the relationship with the 
client.
90
 
2.3.4 Suspicious activity reporting 
The reporting of suspicious transactions and activities is another critical aspect of the 
country’s ability to utilize financial information to combat ML, terrorism financing and 
other financial crimes
91
. To be able to determine that suspicious or unusual transactions 
are in fact occurring, banks need to use sophisticated software to monitor transactions 
and business partners. They also need to have access to watch lists to identify higher 
risk counterparts
92
. 
If has been acknowledged by Latvian courts that delayed reporting of suspicious 
transactions to the FIU provides for an increased ML risk. By failure to receive the 
information on the suspicious transaction in a timely manner, the FIU cannot perform 
its obligations in the field of ML prevention, inter alia provision of the information to 
the police, prosecution or courts
93
. The suspicious transaction reporting is closely linked 
with the refraining from the executing transactions as both these measures almost 
always are taken in parallel. 
2.3.5 Other measures  
Risk analysis – both of banks’ activities and of individual customers’ activities – is 
another cornerstone of every system to prevent ML at banks. One objective of risk 
analysis is to identify customer relationships that represent an elevated risk for an 
institution and that consequently must be treated as high-risk. The provisions of the 
risk-based AML/CTF approach obligate credit institutions to classify all customers 
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according to the specific risk they represent.
94
These risk assessment processes, though 
certainly not arbitrary, are not particularly standardised or categorised. There is no 
calculation of risk factors based on an equation such as probability x severity x 
detectability, as is the case in risk assessment in other sectors
95
.  
The customers’ risk rating is an important tool to trigger further diligence requirements, 
because it determines the level of necessary due diligence. Also, the risk rating 
determines the degree to which new customers need to be scrutinised and to which 
review, and documentation obligations arise
96
. 
The structural and process organization of credit institutions is another key component 
of the system to prevent ML. Here, not just the quality and amount of infrastructure of 
the units charged with the prevention of ML are important; but the design of the 
processes is also significant. The organisation of the credit institution must be such that 
all information about customers can be ascertained and measures can be taken to 
prevent transactions linked to ML.
 97
 
Pursuant to Article 20 of the AML/CTF Law after establishment of a business 
relationship or when executing occasional transactions the banks must continuously 
monitor the activities and transactions of the customers in order to ascertain that the 
transactions are not considered unusual or suspicious. Upon carrying out monitoring of 
customers’ transaction the banks have to pay special attention to transactions 
uncharacteristic to the specific customers – either in size or complexity, as well as to 
transactions that have no apparent economic purpose or are concluded with persons 
from high-risk third countries. 
Thus, banks must use their internal data and IT systems not just for regular reviews of 
customers’ primary data, but also to perform the ongoing monitoring of transactions. 
Transaction monitoring represents a key component of the procedure to prevent ML at a 
credit institution
98
. Controls are applied through top-down internal control relationship 
between a parent company and its branches and subsidiaries, wherever established.
99
 
Chapter 1 established that ML could have various negative effects - economic, social 
and political, in both the short and long term. The banks are tasked with the obligation 
of being a “watchdog” of the financial system having specific obligations in the AML 
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field. In the next Chapter, the extent to which banks have a civil liability towards their 
customers if the banks apply these AML measures improperly and consequently cause 
losses to the customers will be explored. 
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3. CIVIL LIABILITY OF BANKS 
In this Chapter the civil liability of banks vis-à-vis their customers for failure to 
properly apply the restrictive AML measures that cause them losses will be reviewed. In 
the first subchapter the background of such civil liability will be regarded reviewing. In 
the following subchapter it will be discussed whether the liability grounds provided in 
the AML/CTF Law are exhaustive or there are additional grounds and occasions when 
the banks can have the liability and lastly the types of civil liability shall be observed.  
3.1 The background for civil liability 
Customers’ rights are encroached upon when the bank applies the restrictive measures 
under the AML regulation. The fulfilment of the banks’ AML/CTF obligations that 
have been described by some authors as „investigation without criminal proceedings”100 
may lead to encroachment of individuals’ legal rights and interests. 
These measures primarily encroach upon the rights to property of the customers, 
although other customers’ rights might also be relevant, including the right of defence, 
the protection of individuals’ procedural rights, and guarantees that would be available 
e.g. in the criminal proceedings
101
, but are not available to customers when the 
restrictive AML measures are applied. For instance, the right to exercise ownership of 
the funds is encroached upon if the bank refrains from executing the transaction – the 
customers cannot make use of their funds - make further transactions, settle invoices for 
received goods and services, distribute dividends etc. If a bank wrongly refuses to make 
a payment to its customer, the customers’ claim will most often be for damages to 
compensate for any losses incurred by the customer because of the bank’s failure to 
pay
102
. Furthermore, if the bank decides to terminate the relationship with the customer, 
the effect is similar as the customer no longer having access to the financial market and 
is unable to make use of the money transfers. The question of whether banks can be 
held liable for such an encroachment or can be exempted from such liability will be 
explored in this part of the thesis. 
There are various legal definitions of civil liability. The theoretical aspects of the 
definition of the notion of civil liability as such are outside the scope of this thesis. The 
author considers that for the purposes of the thesis the definition suggested by Prof. 
Kalvis Torgāns thoroughly reflects the potential civil liability of the banks towards their 
customers for the improper application of AML/CTF regulation. Civil liability is thus 
defined in the following way: 
“an obligation that arises as the result of an illicit conduct, supplements or 
replaces another violated obligation or emerges anew due to a deficit and that 
manifests as the obligation to prevent or mitigate the negative effects of the 
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illicit conduct by way of a financial compensation, contractual penalty or 
another satisfaction to the creditor
103”. 
The obligations of the banks regarding their customers within the field of AML are 
founded on public law, however upon enforcement of these AML regulation the 
relationship between the banks and their customers does not turn into a public 
relationship between the bank as a public authority and the customer as a private 
entity
104
. Therefore, the author considers that the legal remedies of the customers and 
potential customer vis-a-vis the banks must be regarded within the framework of private 
(civil) law.  
Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism provides 
that each signatory state shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that interested parties affected by the AML measures have effective 
legal remedies to preserve their rights
105
. An interested party includes any party whose 
rights have been are affected
106
. As explained by the Explanatory Report to this 
Convention, the claims of the affected parties should in principle be honoured in cases 
where the innocence or bona fides of the party concerned is likely or beyond reasonable 
doubt. If no final confiscation order has been made against him or her, the accused may 
also qualify as an interested party
107
. The legal provisions of the national law, as 
required by this Article of the Convention, must therefore guarantee “effective” legal 
remedies for interested third parties. However, Article 8 of the Convention does not 
bestow upon private citizens any right beyond those normally permitted by the domestic 
law of the Party
108
.  
Chapter XIV of the AML/CTF Law explicitly deals with the compensation of losses 
caused by the subjects of the Law, including the banks, by unjustified and unlawful 
application of the AML/CTF obligations, distinguishing between the two types of 
wrongdoings. The author considers that the compensation mechanism under Chapter 
XIV of the AML/CTF Law is ambiguous and has various deficiencies from the 
perspective of substance and form that renders the regulation hardly applicable.  
The procedure laid down in Chapter XIV of the AML/CTF Law provides that the 
private person is compensated for the losses incurred due to inability to access its assets 
held by the subject of the AML/CTF Law if it later is established that the freezing was 
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been unfounded. The losses are primarily reimbursed by the state that may later have a 
recourse claim against the subject of the AML/CTF Law. Such procedure is explained 
by the legislator with the rationale that, as the legislator has obliged the subject of the 
AML/CTF Law to mandatorily execute certain AML obligations the subject of the law 
is exempted from liability. The liability therefore is covered by the state itself
109
.  
The author considers that the approach that the state primarily compensates the losses to 
the customers and then has a right to bring recourse claims against the banks is 
debatable. On the one hand, it is easier for the customers to claim compensation from 
the state than guessing whom the real infringer of their rights is (the state authorities or 
the banks). On the other hand, if the banks having the two-level review system for have 
infringed the rights of the customers, the banks’ civil liability (initially by the 
Prosecutor General’s office and then the courts in the civil claim) indicates 
shortcomings of procedural efficiency. This would be particularly relevant if the 
customers’ rights would have been violated by the banks, by not only the conduct 
explicitly provided in the AML/CTF Law giving right to compensation, but also other 
infringements of the AML regulation. This issue might be subject to further research in 
the field of the bank’s liability towards customers for improper application of the AML 
measures. 
Pursuant to Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law the compensation of losses shall take 
place if the banks have refrained from the execution of the transactions and frozen the 
assets of their customers and, consequently, the following decisions have been adopted:  
 An order of the FIU to terminate the refraining from executing transactions; 
 A notice of the FIU issued to the subject of the AML/CTF Law on the fact that 
the FIU has not detected any basis to issue the freezing order; 
 An order of the FIU issued to the subject of the AML/CTF Law by which it is 
notified that further temporary freezing of funds is to be terminated because the 
FIU has not detected any basis to issue the freezing order; 
 An order of the FIU to revoke the freezing order; 
 A decision of the Prosecutor-General or specially authorised prosecutor by 
which the freezing order of the FIU is repealed. 
However, the AML/CTF Law remains silent as to whether the aggrieved persons may 
claim compensation for losses in other instances of the improper application of AML 
obligations not explicitly covered by Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law. One might 
argue that, as the list of legal grounds for compensation of losses provided in Article 68 
(1) of the AML/CTF Law is exhaustive, the legislator has intentionally limited the 
instances, which give grounds to claims of the customers. On the other hand, other 
instances of wrongful enforcement of restrictive AML measures (e.g., unjustified 
termination of legal relationship) are also causing losses to the customers. It can be 
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argued that such exclusion does not comply with the general principle of compensation 
for losses. 
The question of whether the liability provided in the AML/CTF Law covers all possible 
civil liability of banks that can arise due to improper application of the AML/CTF 
obligations will now be explored. 
3.2 Non-exhaustive application of the AML/CTF Law 
The concept of the compensation of losses due to improper application of the AML 
regulation by the subjects of the AML/CTF Law was introduced into law in the 
amendments of 7 June 2012
110
. Prior to these amendments, the AML/CTF Law was 
completely silent on the matter whether the customers are entitled to bring claims either 
against the subjects of the AML/CTF Law or the investigative authorities. These 
amendments were adopted as a follow up to prevent the deficiencies indicated in the 
judgment of 28 May 2009 of the Constitutional Court of Latvia in Case No.2008-47-
01
111
.  
In this case the Constitutional Court concluded that although the legislator had 
established a procedure that a private person (subject of the Law) within the frame civil 
transactions has AML/CTF obligations that encroach on the basic rights of the customer 
the legislator “has not provided for effective measures that would allow challenging 
unlawful decisions of such subject of the AML/CTF Law”112. The Constitutional Court 
also stated that the legislator had also not provided for a mechanism that the State in a 
reasonable process and amount would compensate for the losses that incurred to the 
person, due to the fact that the bank has deterred from the transaction it later turned out 
that the decision was not well founded
113
.  
Importantly, the Constitutional Court also noted that although the AML/CTF Law is 
silent on the compensation mechanism, it cannot be excluded that the customer of the 
bank based on the directly applicable Article 92 of Satversme
114
, constitution of Latvia, 
brought a claim in the court of regular jurisdiction pursuant to civil procedure against 
the bank for compensation of losses  “if the conduct of the credit institution is not based 
on the [AML/CTF] law or it exceeds the [scope of the] law or the order of the FIU”115. 
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Thus, in this judgment the Constitutional Court already hinted that the aggrieved 
persons might have claims against the banks for improper application of AML 
obligations. 
Second sentence of Article 92 of Satversme provides that „[e]veryone, where his or her 
rights are violated without basis, has a right to commensurate compensation”116. This 
provision enshrines a general constitutional principle that either the injured party or the 
society in whole, which is represented by the state and its legislative and judicial 
enforcement power, cannot ignore a violation of one’s rights117. Similarly, Article 1635 
(1) of the Civil Law
118
 provides that every infringement of rights, that is, every 
wrongful act per se, as a result of which harm has been caused (also moral damage), 
must give the person who suffered the harm therefrom the right to claim satisfaction 
from the infringer, insofar as he or she may be held at fault for such act. 
Another general constitutional principle is that every limitation of basic rights must be 
interpreted narrowly. The author considers that the same rule also applies to 
interpretation of Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law. Namely, this Article only lists 
circumstances that allow the aggrieved person to claim compensation for losses under 
the specific procedure provided in Chapter XIV of the AML/CTF Law – to request the 
state to compensate the losses. It does not limit any other potential claims of the 
aggrieved persons not covered by Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law. Under the Civil 
Procedure Law the aggrieved persons can bring such claims directly against the 
wrongdoer (e.g. the bank) that improperly applied the AML obligations. 
The author considers that this conclusion must be explicitly provided in the AML/CTF 
Law to prevent misconception in future. Interpretation through provisions of the 
Constitution to allow the aggrieved persons to bring claims against the banks is 
excessively burdensome for private persons. Therefore, the author suggests amending 
the Article 68 by adding a following paragraph (3): 
“If the losses are caused to the person by such conduct of the subject of 
the law in application of the Law that is not covered by the first 
paragraph of this Article, for protection of its legitimate interests the 
aggrieved person may bring a claim against the subject of the Law 
pursuant to the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Law. The court 
must observe the exemption of liability, including the civil liability, of 
the subject of the Law provided in the Law
119
.
120
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3.3 General types of civil liability 
Civil liability can typically manifest itself in damages compensation for losses, 
compensation for non-pecuniary harm (including the moral harm) and contractual 
penalty. The other types of civil liability for unlawful activity include request to stop the 
wrongdoing, payment on interest, and cancellation of the contract
121
. However, the 
primary objective of civil liability is to prevent the negative consequences of the illicit 
activity to the injured party,
122
 and as far as possible reinstate the situation before the 
offense took place. Thus, the compensation for losses (damages) is the primary remedy 
in case of an unlawful conduct.  
Article 6 of the AML/CTF Law defines the losses as “a materially assessable 
deprivation, which is caused to a person because of unjustified or unlawful conduct by 
the FIU or the subject of the Law”. This definition directly corresponds to the general 
definition of losses provided in Article 1770 of the Civil Law. The following three 
prerequisites must be met before the obligation to reimburse for losses is triggered: 1) 
unlawful activity of the offender; 2) losses in a certain amount; 3) causal link between 
the offense and the losses incurred
123
. 
The Civil Law generally provides for the principle of full (complete) compensation of 
losses
124
. At the same time Article 1776 (2) states that the infringer may request a 
reduction of the compensation amount which a victim could have prevented through the 
exercise of due care, except in a case of malicious infringement of their rights. 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 1779.
1
 of the Civil Law the infringer must only 
compensate the losses in such amount, which could have been reasonably foreseen upon 
entering into a transaction as, expected consequences of non-performance, unless such 
non-performance occurred through malicious intention or gross negligence. These 
provisions provide the banks with an option to limit their liability for losses by 
submitting evidence regarding the customers’ opportunities to limit the losses and 
regarding their own fault. 
Pursuant to Article 1716 of the Civil Law the contractual penalty is defined as a penalty 
which a person undertakes to bear regarding his or her obligation in such case as he or 
she does not perform the obligation, does not perform it satisfactorily or does not 
perform it within due time (time period). Application of the contractual penalty 
becomes a manifestation of a liability and serves for the purpose of both faster and 
easier (from the matter of proof perspective) compensation for losses or punishment to 
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the infringer
125
.  From the perspective of the banks’ liability for the improper 
application of the AML regulation, the contractual penalty becomes relevant if it is 
provided in the contract between the banks and the customer, e.g. for unlawful 
termination of the contract or delay of making the ordered transaction. In practice, the 
banks rarely agree on significant contractual penalties with their retail customers. 
However, this remedy may become much more relevant for “tailor-made” contracts 
with larger customers. 
3.4 Liability under the AML/CTF Law 
As described above, Chapter XIV of the AML/CTF Law now explicitly deals with the 
compensation of losses caused by the subjects of the Law, including the banks, by 
unjustified and unlawful application of the AML obligations in circumstances provided 
in Article 68 (1). The Law covers liability for unjustified and unlawful application of 
the Law, by making a clear distinction between the two concepts. This distinction 
follows the rationale that the aggrieved person must be compensated, regardless of the 
fact whether the subject of the Law acted strictly within the framework of the 
AML/CTF Law (due to unjustified or unlawful application)
126
. 
Article 64 (1) states that an action by the subject of the AML/CTF Law is unjustified, if 
upon receiving the decision the subject acted in good faith in compliance with the 
provisions of AML/CTF Law, however later one of the legal basis for compensation of 
losses determined in Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law has arisen.  
Article 65 (1) of the AML/CTF Law prescribes that a conduct of the subject of the Law 
is unlawful, if it does not comply with the provisions of the AML/CTF Law. It is 
important to note that the wording of Article 65 (1) does not link the right for the 
compensation for unlawful activity with the subjects’ good faith or circumstances 
prescribed in Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law. Therefore, one may argue that the 
compensation procedure under Chapter XIV of the Law applies to all unlawful activities 
of the subjects of the Law. However, Article 68 (1) itself states that it lists “the legal 
basis” for compensation of losses, thus establishing the legal framework of application 
of Chapter XIV. It can be concluded that Article 68 (1) refers to both unjustified and 
unlawful application of the AML/CTF obligations by the subjects of the Law. Thus, the 
compensation mechanism for unlawful application of the o AML/CTF Law under 
Chapter XIV only occurs in the circumstances provided under Article 68 (1).  
The author considers that to prevent uncertainty in its application, the AML/CTF Law 
Article 65 (1) needs to be amended specifically stating this link likewise Article 64 (1). 
Thus, this provision of the law should be stated in the following wording:  
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“The action of the subject of the Law shall be unlawful, if it does not 
comply with the provisions of this Law and one of the legal basis for the 
compensation of losses determined in Article 68 (1) of this Law has 
arisen”127. 
Article 67 (1) of the AML/CTF Law prescribes that the right to compensation for losses 
takes place if there is a direct causal link between the unjustified or unlawful actions of 
the subject of the Law or the FIU and loss caused to a person. The causal link is an 
objective link between the actions of the subject of the Law or the FIU and its 
consequences following in terms of time that causes loss, namely, the wrongful conduct 
is the main factor, which has inevitably caused such consequences. This provision 
repeats the general notion of civil law that prescribes that a prerequisite for 
compensation of losses is the causal link between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the 
losses incurred
 128
. 
However, the following provision of the AML/CTF Law is more ambiguous. Article 67 
(2) states that: 
“[T]he causal link for compensation of losses does not exist, if the same 
loss would have arisen also if circumstances giving legal basis to 
compensation of losses had not taken place”. 
In other words, this provision states that if there are also other circumstances causing 
the losses apart from the circumstances listed in Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law 
then there is no causal link between the subjects’ (e.g. banks’) conduct and the losses 
incurred and thus the losses do not have to be compensated. Considering the general 
conclusion made in the previous Chapter that losses inflicted by an inappropriate 
application of the AML/CTF obligations other than those listed in Article 68 (1) have to 
be compensated in the regular procedure according the Civil Procedure Law, the Article 
67 (2) AML/CTF Law must be interpreted as only describing the limits for application 
of Article 68 (1) AML/CTF Law. It does not limit other potential claims against the 
banks. 
The aggrieved person can primarily claim the losses from the State in circumstances 
specifically provided in Article 68 (1) of the AML/CTF Law, not from the banks. The 
rationale of such arrangement is that as the State has imposes a mandatory obligation on 
the banks, e.g. reporting suspicious transactions or refraining from the transactions, 
while at the same time exempting the subjects from liability for actions in good faith, 
the State has committed itself to be liable for the actions of the subject
129
. 
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Article 70 (1) of the AML/CTF Law provides that the following direct losses shall be 
compensated to a person: a) losses due to refraining from executing transactions or 
unearned income as a result of suspension of the relevant actions; b) losses caused as a 
result of non-fulfilment of obligations or delay; c) other direct losses, which are 
determined in the Civil Law and which a person may prove. The AML/CTF Law 
provides that in determining the proper amount of compensation for loss, the legal and 
factual justification and motives of the action by the subject of the AML/CTF Law, as 
well as the conduct of the customer, must be considered.  
Article 71 (3) of the AML/CTF Law limits the compensation depending on the amount 
of the losses. The losses are compensated in full amount if they do not exceed 
150,000.00 EUR. If the losses are between 150,000.00 EUR and 1,425,000.00 EUR the 
sums exceeding 150,000.00 EUR are compensated by 75%, and the sums exceeding 
1,425,000.00 EUR are compensated by 50%. The AML/CTF Law limits the liability of 
the subjects of the law and the state itself to encourage them to perform their AML 
obligations and not be discouraged by the potential claims for damages against them. 
However, such limitation of compensation and failure of full restitution is questionable 
from the perspective of the rights of the aggrieved person, even more so considering 
that second sentence of Satversme, i.e., a legal norm of a higher power provides for a 
basic right to receive an “adequate” compensation. The question regarding the limitation 
of recoverable losses is constitutional may be the subject of further research as it relates 
to the liability of the improper application of the restrictive AML measures.   
According to Article 76 (1) of the AML/CTF Law, if the State has compensated the 
losses to the customer of the subject of the AML/CTF Law due to its unlawful conduct 
the State has a recourse claim against the specific subject of the AML/CTF Law.  
The author has compared the regulation of the AML/CTF Law with that of the Estonian 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act
130
 (hereafter – “Estonia 
AML Act”) passed on 26 October 2017 with respect of the banks’ potential liability 
towards their customers. Notably, the Estonian AML Act does not contain provisions 
regarding the persons’ right to bring claims against the subjects of the Law for improper 
application of the AML measures. Likewise, the AML/CTF Law, Paragraph 52 of the 
Estonian AML Act contains a general clause for the discharge of the subjects’ liability 
for damages caused to a person or customer if the AML measures have been applied in 
good faith. However, it remains silent on the legal consequences if this obligation, if it 
has been breached by them. In this regard, the the regulation of the AML/CTF Law is 
superior as it, albeit being subject to potential improvements, at least, specifically 
indicates that the aggrieved customers have remedies for infringement of their rights by 
improper application of the restrictive AML measures. 
Unnecessary distinction between “unjustified” and “unlawful” conduct 
As an additional matter the author considers that the distinction between the 
“unjustified” and “unlawful” activities of the subjects of the AML/CTF Law is 
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unnecessary. The intention of the legislator for inclusion of Chapter XIV of the 
AML/CTF Law was aimed at the reimbursement of losses for private individuals due to 
the freezing of their funds, if it is later established by the authorities that the freezing 
was not required
131
.   
If the bank acted in good faith in refraining from the transaction (freezing the funds), the 
state reimburses for the damage and the bank is exempted from liability. If the subject 
of the Law did not act in good faith, the state reimburses the damage and brings a 
recourse claim against the subject of the Law. Thus, in essence, the matter does not 
depend on the subjects’ hypothetic compliance with the AML/CTF regulation, but on 
the determination of whether the subject acted in good or bad faith. 
Therefore, the distinction between the subjects’ “unjustified” and “unlawful” conduct in 
respect of freezing the assets of the customers is artificial and unnecessarily confusing. 
The two notions in Latvian “nepamatota rīcība” and “nelikumīga rīcība” are close 
synonyms that both refer to an infringement of a certain regulation, thus rendering the 
application of Chapter XIV AML/CTF Law even more confusing. 
The author accordingly suggests reworking the regulation under Chapter XIV 
AML/CTF Law without the distinction of the two notions and subjecting the potential 
recourse claim on the faith, in which the subject of the Law refrained from executing the 
transaction. 
 
In this Chapter the notion of the banks’ civil liability for improper application of the 
restrictive AML measures was explored. It was established that the customers of the 
banks could claim damages for improper freezing of the customers’ assets under the 
procedure provided in the AML/CTF Law. However, it was further concluded that the 
AML/CTF Law does not exclude any other potential claims of the aggrieved customers 
who may bring such claims directly against the the banks that improperly applied the 
AML obligations under the Civil Procedure Law. It was established that the primary 
remedy of the customers is claiming damages from the banks, but in specific 
circumstances also other remedies like contractual penalties, may be available. 
In the following Chapter the notion of the banks’ exemption of liability will be 
explored, also testing its limits in the light of the principle of good faith.  
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4. EXEMPTION OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY AND ITS LIMITS 
In was established in the previous Chapter that the banks could be held liable for failing 
to properly apply the restrictive AML measures towards their customer. However, this 
potential liability must be regarded in light of the general exemption of liability 
provided both in the international and national AML regulation. The  exemption 
generally applies if the subject of the AML regulation has applied the AML measures in 
good faith.  
In this chapter, the principle of exemption of civil liability will be researched. It will 
further be assessed whether or not,  and on what conditions, this exemption is 
inapplicable, in the light of the principle of good faith. More specifically, how the 
exemption can be pierced if the banks have terminated the legal relationship with their 
customers or refrained from executing the bank transfer based on the AML regulation 
will be reviewed. In this regard, the court practice of other countries that have already 
faced the claims of the customers against the banks, will be explored. 
4.1 Exemption of the civil liability 
Recommendation 21 of FATF Recommendations
132
 provides that the states must ensure 
that financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees are protected by law 
from criminal and civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative 
provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the FIU, even if they did not 
know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether 
illegal activity actually occurred. Besides this provision regarding the exemption of 
liability for the breach of any restriction on disclosure of information, there is no 
reference in the FATF recommendation regarding either liability of the banks vis-a-vis 
their customers, or exemption of such liability.  
Pursuant to Article 26 of Directive No.2005/60/EC
133
 disclosure by the bank concerned 
shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure imposed on the bank and 
shall not involve the institution or person or its directors or employees in liability of any 
kind. In other words, reporting suspicious activity to the competent authority will not 
amount to a violation of privacy requirements under civil or criminal laws
134
. This 
provision has an all-important role to play in the prevention of international crime and it 
suggests full recognition of the overriding importance of the core rules laid down for the 
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collective protection of international public interests versus the rules protecting 
individual persons’ interests135.  
The legislator explains the exemption of the named liability with the fact that the 
legislator has obliged the subject of the AML/CTF Law to mandatorily execute certain 
AML/CTF obligations
136
. Article 40 (1) of the AML/CTF Law provides for the general 
notion of the liability exemption of the banks and their management stating that if the 
subject of the Law complies with the requirements of this Law, the action of its 
management (the members of management and supervisory board) and employees 
thereof may not be qualified for a violation of the norms regulating the professional 
activity or the requirements of the supervisory and control authorities.  Although, the 
exemption of the liability of the management and employees was specifically 
introduced under the AML/CTF Law by the recent amendments of the AML/CTF Law 
that came into force on 9 November 2017
137
, the author considers that the potential 
liability of the management had to assessed on the same terms as that of the subjects of 
the AML/CTF Law also before the amendments. 
Other paragraphs of Article 40 of the AML/CTF Law in detail provide for more specific 
exemptions. Thus, Article 40 (2) of the AML/CTF Law provides that if the subject of 
the Law has reported in good faith to the FIU in compliance with the requirements of 
the AML/CTF Law, the reporting to the FIU shall not be deemed to be a disclosure of 
confidential information and, therefore, the subject of the Law shall not be subject to 
legal nor civil liability. The liability is exempted, irrespective of whether the fact of ML 
or an attempt to carry out such conduct or another associated criminal offence is proved 
or not proved during the pre-trial criminal proceedings or on trial, as well as irrespective 
of the provisions of the contract between the customer and the subject of the AML/CTF 
Law. 
Article 40 (3) of the AML/CTF Law deals with exemption of liability for refraining 
from execution and termination of legal relationship with the clients. It states that  
„[i]f the subject of the [AML/CTF ]Law in good faith has refrained from 
executing the transaction [..], has ended business relationships or has 
requested early fulfilment of obligations [..], the subject of the 
[AML/CTF ]Law, its management (the members of management and 
supervisory board) and employees shall not be subject to legal or civil 
liability due to such refraining or delay of the transaction, ending 
business relationships, or requesting the early fulfilment of obligations”.  
Pursuant to Article 40 (5) of the AML/CTF Law, if the FIU has issued an order 
regarding freezing of funds, then, irrespectively of the outcome of the freezing of funds, 
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the subject of the AML/CTF Law shall not be subject to legal liability, including the 
civil liability. 
According to to Article 43 (3) of the AML/CTF Law a credit institution or financial 
institution shall not be subject to civil liability for the termination of the business 
relationship with a customer or for requesting the early fulfilment of the customer's 
obligations if the requirements of the law have been complied with. 
4.2 Limits of the exemption of liability 
The banks’ liability vis-a-vis their customers can only be triggered if the banks have 
failed to appropriately apply the AML regulation due to some shortcomings committed 
by the banks. However, if the grounds for adoption of the restrictive measures are 
objective and are well based, e.g. under legal provisions or the customers’ presence in a 
foreign sanction list, the potential liability is largely excluded.  
For instance, on 28 April 2018 the Latvian government adopted amendments
138
 to the 
AML/CTF Law thee Latvian legislator adopted regulation restricting banks from having 
a legal relationship with shell companies if these companies meet the two criterions 
provided in Article 1 15
1
) of the AML/CTF Law. If the banks terminate the legal 
relationship with such companies, there will be no requirement of a subjective 
assessment of the banks regarding their customers as the law directly prohibits the 
prohibition of such legal relationship.  
As stated in the previous Chapter, the exemption of the civil liability of the banks 
applies only as far as the bank has acted in good faith. Therefore, to assess the scope of 
the exemption it is necessary to determine what the principle of good faith entails and 
what obligations (if any) it imposes on the banks in the application of the AML 
restrictive measures. 
Article 1 of the Civil Law provides that rights shall be exercised, and duties performed 
in good faith. “Good faith” is a general legal clause – a legal concept of a general nature 
provided in the legal provisions that must be filled with a specific content to allow 
application of the legal norm for resolution of a specific real-life circumstances. General 
clauses are used in drafting legal norms as the understanding of the general clauses may 
in time be flexibly adjusted to the society’s ever-changing assessment of the legal, 
social, and every day phenomena
139
. 
The legal term of “good faith” and the similar term of “fairness” are very ample and 
broad. The existing theory of private law and practice admit that the criterion of good 
faith is an auxiliary criterion, if the law or the contract does not provide a clear solution 
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to the problem
140
. “Good faith” is an objective, not subjective criterion. It means that 
Article 1 of the Civil Law refers to practice that can be objectively requested for 
ensuring fairness in civil circulation and this measure does not depend solely on the 
assessment of the exerciser of the right
141
. When it turns out that literal application of 
the legal provision would lead to an evidently unfair result, the courts must find a fair 
resolution for the situation by applying the special legal provision
142
 - the AML/CTF 
restrictive measure in the context of this thesis. 
The obligation to exercise the persons’ rights in a manner that considers other persons’ 
legitimate interest and established trust is derived from the principle of good faith. This, 
firstly means that the person must exercise their rights and fulfil obligations not 
formally, but from the perspective of the said right’s (obligation’s) intention and aim143. 
It is appropriate to speak about exercising rights in an unrighteous way in situations 
when, although acting within the framework of subjective rights set by the law or the 
contract (i.e. within the framework that formally conforms with the content of the right 
in question), the exercise of these subjective rights manifests as a conduct inconsistent 
with good faith
144
. In a broader sense, the aim of the principle of good faith is to 
facilitate mutual loyalty, trust, and fairness in the legal environment. Thus, the law 
requires both loyal behaviour of the persons, while at the same time prohibits disloyal 
conduct towards other participants of the civil relationships
145
. The basis of the principle 
of good faith is the rationale that in exercise of the rights and fulfilment of obligations 
every person must act within the framework of ethical boundaries, a breach of which 
does not enjoy legal protection
146
. 
Considering the afore mentioned, the author considers that applying the restrictive AML 
measures towards their customers in good faith requires not only that the banks are 
prohibited from displaying malicious intent to harm their customers, but also that the 
application of the measures must be reasonably assessed based on objective evidence. 
Enforcement of the AML regulation by the banks must not be arbitrary and it must be 
justified by sufficient evidence. For the purpose of this thesis, the arbitrary conduct 
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corresponds to the definition of an arbitrary judicial decision provided in the Black’s 
Law Dictionary: a conduct “founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or 
fact”147. 
Thus, the author agrees with the conclusions of the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
regarding the refraining from executing the transactions that: 
“the sole doubts of the subject of the [AML/CTF] law do not represent 
sufficient grounds to deter from the transaction, as the doubts have to be 
“well grounded, i.e., there must be specific factual circumstances that 
indicate the connection of the customer to ML or TF
148”. 
Hence, pursuant to the principle of good faith, when a bank applies the restrictive AML 
measures, it is obliged to gather sufficient evidence and information about the customer 
in question, otherwise risking being held liable for improper application of the law vis-
à-vis its customer. The customer can rely on the fact that the bank will perform its 
obligations, including the AML obligations, in good faith with proper diligence. As has 
been promptly stated by professor K. Torgāns that under the formula “in private law 
everything that is not prohibited, is allowed” “it is wrong to study if the law directly 
prohibits a certain action. It is important to verify whether the provisions of Article 1 
and 1415 of the Civil Law have not been violated”149. Exercise of the right in certain 
situations may become contrary to the principle of good faith if, upon exercise of the 
right, the subject contravenes their previous conduct (venire contra factum proprium)
 
150
, especially if the factual circumstances have not changed (e.g. a stricter AML 
regulation has not been adopted or the factors defining the customer’s AML risk 
exposure have not changed). 
Subjective exercise of the right under the good faith principle is not allowed if the 
person does not have a legitimate interest that would justify exercise of the right or if 
the interests of the opposing party are to be considered as more important
151
. Risk 
management and compliance with the AML regulation evidently qualify as the bank’s 
legitimate interest. However, the bank’s decision cannot be intentionally harmful to the 
customer (e.g. a competitor) or completely arbitrary, e.g. for reporting all transactions of 
their customers to the FIU or de-risking (de-banking) whole classes of customers (if 
there are no grounds whatsoever for such risks) to escape hypothetical administrative 
liability for failure to enforce the AML rules. Such conduct does not comply with the 
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principle of good faith and would expose the bank to a potential liability towards their 
customers. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the AML/CTF Law exempts banks from liability if 
they acted in “good faith”, not their being in “good awareness”. Although both the 
terms look almost identical in Latvian (“Laba ticība”and „labticība”) they refer to 
different notions. “Good awareness” is not a legally ethical principle as is the “good 
faith”. “Good awareness” is a subjective intellectual element – the confidence of the 
person regarding existence or non-existence of some facts”152. Thus, it can be concluded 
that AML/CTF Law and other AML sources do not directly link the exemption of the 
civil liability to the banks’ knowledge or suspicions of their customers’ potential 
involvement in ML, but the overall application of the AML regulation in a prudent and 
diligent manner (in good faith). Certainly, if the banks know or must have known about 
such customers’ involvement in ML, the banks are obliged to impose the restrictive 
AML measures and there would be no grounds for civil liability. However, the author 
considers that the application of the good faith principle transcends such awareness and 
obliges the bank to gather sufficient evidence and information on which a reasonable 
suspicion is based before applying the restrictive measures. 
4.3 The termination or refusal of the legal relationship 
In civil relationships the parties are free to decide on whether to sign a contract, with 
whom and what content should be included therein
153
. The law recognises the freedom 
of banks to choose with whom they wish to do business, and the law, often reinforced 
by the underlying contract with the customer, enables them to terminate that 
relationship when they choose to do so, provided that they give reasonable notice
154
.  
Furthermore, the high costs of performing the AML measures and risks of potential 
sanctions among other factors may lead the banks to a process called de-risking. This 
notion refers to the phenomenon of banks terminating or restricting business 
relationships with clients or categories of clients “to avoid, rather than manage, risk in 
line with the FATF’s risk-based approach” 155 to minimise compliance cost and 
effort
156
. De-risking can in fact be described as a form of risk avoidance
157
.  
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The right to terminate the legal transaction with the customer is explicitly provided in 
the FATF recommendations. Pursuant Recommendation 11, if the bank is unable to 
comply with the applicable requirements of customer due diligence, it should be 
required not to open the account, commence business relations, or perform the 
transaction; in short, it should be required to terminate the business relationship
158
. 
However, the FATF Recommendations only require financial institutions to terminate 
customer relationships on a case-by-case basis where the ML risks cannot be mitigated. 
The FATF itself has stated that the wholesale cutting loose of entire classes of 
customers without considering, seriously and comprehensively, their level of risk or risk 
mitigation measures for individual customers within a particular sector “is not in line 
with the FATF standards”159. Applying an overly cautious, non-risk-based approach to 
AML safeguards when providing financial services (both at the on-boarding stage or in 
the context of ongoing relationships) can have the unintended consequence of excluding 
legitimate consumers and businesses from the regulated financial system
160
. A key 
FATF concern is that the termination of relationships can potentially force people and 
entities into less regulated or unregulated channels that are not supportive of AML 
measures
161
.  
The issue of de-risking or financial exclusion is a concern that should be kept in mind 
when addressing AML policy. Customers must not be rejected by regulated financial 
providers and compelled to use underground banking or underground transfer 
services
162
. The EU adopted the Payment Accounts Directive in 2014, which provides 
EU consumers with the right to open a payment account that allows them to perform 
essential operations, such as receiving their salaries and making payments. The right is 
certainly not absolute. In specific circumstances, banks may refuse to open or terminate 
an account, for example where there is a breach of ML by the customer, or where the 
customer abuses the account, for instance, by committing fraud against the bank. 
Increased due diligence costs are not a sufficient reason to close that account
163
. 
Exercising the right in good faith means acting in a manner that considers the other 
persons’ legitimate interest and established trust. It has been suggested in the legal 
                                                          
158
 Financial Action Task Force, (2012-2018), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FATF, Paris, France, p.14, Available on: www.fatf-
gafi.org/recommendations.htm, Accessed 10 April 2018. 
159
 Financial Action Task Force publication, “FATF clarifies risk-based approach: case-by-case, not 
wholesale de-risking, publication”, Available online: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/rba-and-de-risking.html, Accessed 6 April 2018. 
160
 Financial Action Task Force Guidance “Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures 
and 
Financial Inclusion. With a Supplement on Customer Due Diligence”, November 2017, p.2, Available 
online: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Updated-2017-FATF-2013-Guidance.pdf. 
Accessed 9 April 2018. 
161
 Louis De Koker; Supriya Singh; Jonathan Capal, “Closure of Bank Accounts of Remittance Service 
Providers: Global Challenges and Community Perspectives in Australia”, 36 U. Queensland L.J. 119 
(2017), p.128 
162
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the assessment of the 
risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border 
activities, p. 8, Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45319, Accessed 17 
April 2018 
163
 Paragraph 47 of the Preamble. 
39 
  
 
 
Latvian legal doctrine that, even if the contract between the parties provides for one 
party’s right to freely and unilaterally withdraw from the contract, “unilateral 
termination of the contract may be declared as inconsistent with the good faith principle, 
if the party that withdraws from the contract does not have a sufficient reason for such 
conduct”164. The author concludes that the banks are not entitled to arbitrarily terminate 
the contractual relationship with the customers by simply invoking the unilateral 
termination clause or formally referring to Article 43 (3) of the AML/CTF Law to 
exempt them of liability. 
Avoiding risks by refusing and terminating risky relationships when they are not 
commercially justified is a reasonable option for a compliance officer
165
. However, in 
the event of a dispute, the banks have to be able to provide objective justification for the 
closure of their customers’ accounts, similarly to what was established by the High 
Court of Justice of the United Kingdom in the Dahabshiil
166
 case examined below. The 
decision to terminate certain relationships must be justified by “objective necessity”, i.e. 
such termination should be indispensable and proportionate to the goal pursued by the 
bank. Generally, liability will not occur if a refusal of relationship is based on a genuine 
need to reduce the ML risk exposure or in situations where the correct information on 
the beneficial owner of the banks is not revealed compelling the banks to terminate the 
relationship. 
Article 1415 of the Civil Law inter alia provides that an impermissible or indecent 
action, the purpose of which is contrary to good faith (moral principles), may not be the 
subject-matter of a lawful transaction; such a transaction is void. If a bank unilaterally 
terminates a contract with the customer based on the provision provided in the contract 
allowing a free termination, such unilateral termination legally is also a transaction. If 
the sole purpose of the termination is to harm the opposing party, it can theoretically be 
argued that such withdrawal may be declared void. However, in such situations a very 
high threshold for proof would be required to prove that the aim of the transaction was 
indeed damaging to the opposing party. In practice, it would be nigh impossible. 
Therefore, the primary remedy for the customer would still be claiming damages for the 
improper application of the obligations by the bank, which itself is a very complicated 
matter, as discussed in this thesis. 
According to the publicly available information, Latvian courts have not yet reviewed 
cases where the banks’ customers bring a claim against the banks for unlawful 
termination of the customer relationship that would be based on improper application of 
the AML regulation. However, considering the increasingly vigorous imposition of the 
AML regulation on Latvian banks by legislators and the FCMC, and the ongoing 
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reduction of banks customers (especially non-residents), the likeliness of such cases is 
continuously increasing. While Latvian court practice is still silent on the issue, the 
courts of other countries have recently already started facing such claims. The author 
will examine some of those cases in which the argumentation may be useful to the 
Latvian practitioners if (more likely – when) the Latvian courts face similar disputes. 
4.3.1 Dahabshiil transfer services ltd. v Barclays bank plc (United 
Kingdom) 
The following is an example of a (partially) successful challenging of the closure of the 
accounts due to the ML/TF risk relevance in the England and Wales High Court (UK) in 
the case Dahabshiil Transfer Services Ltd. v Barclays Bank Plc 
167
 where an application 
on the imposition of interim measures was reviewed by the court. The basic issue in the 
case was whether the defendant, Barclays Bank, should wait until trial or until a further 
order be restrained from terminating the supply of banking services to the claimants, or 
if they should be ordered to continue to supply them with such services
168
. Each of the 
claimants carried out an international money transfer and remittance business and 
banked with Barclays. Barclays gave the applicants notice of its intention to withdraw 
banking services from their businesses. The reasons for termination were related to be 
excessive ML/TF risks of the applicants and the risk-based approach followed by the 
Bank. 
There was no dispute that Barclays was contractually entitled to terminate its provision 
of banking services to each of the claimants. Instead, the claimants contend that by 
giving them notice of its intention to withdraw banking services from their businesses, 
Barclays acted unlawfully, because Barclays was alleged in a dominant position in the 
market for the provision of banking services to money remittance businesses. According 
to the applicants, by ceasing to provide banking services without objective justification, 
Barclays would be abusing its dominant position contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union
169
 and the Chapter II prohibition in the UK’s 
Competition Act 1998
170
.  
The Chancery Division granted the interim injunctions stating that there was a “far 
greater danger of irremediable prejudice to the claimants in refusing the grant of 
injunctions until trial than there would be in granting the injunctions”171. It was ruled 
that a dominant undertaking could commit an abuse where, without justification, it cut 
off supplies of goods and services to an existing customer. However, it is important that 
in the proceedings on the application of interim measures, Barclays’ defence and 
justification for the termination due to ML/TF risk was not fully examined. That would 
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have been done at trial, but the parties settled the case
172
. Still, this is a very important 
decision showing that banks holding a dominant position in the market may be 
subjected to justifying termination of their customer’s accounts even if the closure is 
argued against by the ML/TF risk cutting. The author considers that if the Latvians 
reviewed the dispute, the customers could have also invoked the breach of good faith 
principle in the proceedings. 
4.3.2 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank (South Africa) 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has reviewed another significant case 
regarding termination of the legal relationship with the bank’s customer due to 
AML/CTF risks
 173
. In this case Mr Bredenkamp and entities owned or controlled by 
him applied for an interdict restraining against Standard Bank, a large South African 
bank, from terminating their accounts. Mr Bredenkamp and the related legal entities 
were listed in the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) 
list as part of the imposition of US sanctions on Zimbabwe and due to Mr 
Bredenkamp’s ties to President Mugabe174.  Mr Bredenkamp was allegedly also 
involved in grey-market arms trading, oil distribution and diamond extraction
175
.  
The Bank had stated that, disregarding whether the allegations were correct or not, a 
continuing relationship with Bredenkamp would give rise to “legal, reputational, and 
business risk” and therefore they decided to close the accounts176. The Bank also sought 
to justify its right to terminate its relationship in the contractual terms as the express 
term of its contracts allowed it to close the accounts with reasonable notice. Lack of the 
bank’s good faith (bona fides) was not alleged nor was it argued that the Bank was not 
bona fide in closing the accounts
177
.  
The Supreme Court of South Africa held that: 
“all contractual provisions have to be “reasonable” and [..] their enforcement 
must also be reasonable. [..] However, it is difficult to see how someone can 
insist on opening a banking account with a particular bank and, if there is an 
account, to insist that the relationship should endure against the will, bona fide 
formed, of the bank.
178”. 
 The Court emphasized that the Bank’s cancellation was not premised on the truth of the 
allegations underlying the listing; it was based on the fact of the listing and the possible 
reputational and commercial consequences of the listing for the Bank. Thus, the Court 
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did not request for a certain level of threshold to verify the suspicions of the Bank. The 
OFAC listing per se served the purpose. Furthermore, following the rationale that if the 
agreement provided for an option to cancel the contract without any cause, all the more 
so the bank was entitled to do so given the ML/TF suspicions.  
The author agrees with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of South Africa that being 
listed on a sanctions list of another country’s (e.g. the OFAC list of the US) may present 
grounds for lawful termination of the banks’ legal relationship with their customers 
without exposure to civil liability. However, the bank still needs to put some effort in 
verifying the grounds for such listing and whether the listing is not e.g. evidently a 
measure of political reprisal.  
4.4 Refraining from the executing a transaction 
Pursuant to Article 32 (1) the banks must refrain from executing a transaction if the 
transaction is related with or there are substantiated suspicions that it is related ML, or 
there are substantiated suspicions that the funds are directly or indirectly obtained as a 
result of a criminal offence. Essentially, it means that the bank, on its own initiative, 
freezes the funds in the account of its customer until the FIU has adopted its decision on 
whether to issue a freezing order or to stop the refraining from executing the 
transaction. As described in the previous chapters, the AML/CTF Law provides for 
mechanism that, if after the freezing of the assets, it is established that there were 
initially no grounds for freezing, the state compensates for the losses to the customer. If 
the banks that have refrained from the transactions have acted unlawfully, i.e. not in 
compliance with the regulation of the AML/CTF Law, the banks then can be held liable 
via recourse claim brought by the Prosecutor General’s Office.  
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Regulation No.674 of the Cabinet of Ministers on reporting 
of unusual and suspicious transactions, banks have to include the reasoning for their 
suspicions on the link of the assets to ML and also indicate the typology of the potential 
criminal offense in question
179
. As stated in the annotation of this Regulation the aim of 
this requirement is to encourage the subjects of the AML/CTF Law as the original 
sources of information to perform the initial analysis and to pass high quality 
information to the FIU that can further be effectively used
180
. Thus, this requirement of 
the Regulation shows that the banks must not act arbitrary, and have to be able to 
provide at least some objective information or evidence on which their suspicions are 
based. The same rationale applies to refraining from the execution of transactions as 
these both obligations of the bank are strongly interconnected. 
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The Constitutional Court of Latvia has stated that regarding the refraining from 
executing the transactions the sole doubts do not represent sufficient grounds to deter 
from the transaction, as the doubts have to be “well grounded, i.e., there must be 
specific factual circumstances that indicate the connection of the customer to ML or 
TF
181”.  This statement leads the author to conclude that if the banks have arbitrarily 
and without insufficient (reasonable) evidence and assessment refrained from executing 
the transactions, such conduct can be described as a conduct that is incompliant with the 
provisions of the AML regulation and can therefore be subject to civil liability. The law 
does not prescribe for the threshold of profoundness for such information and evidence, 
although the author considers that it has to be reasonably well grounded, so that an 
average expert in the AML field would objectively arrive at the same conclusion on the 
suspiciousness of the transaction
182
.  
Pursuant to Article 40 (5) of the AML/CTF Law, if the FIU has issued an order 
regarding freezing of funds, then, irrespectively of the outcome of the freezing of funds, 
the subject of the AML/CTF Law shall not be subject to civil liability. Although a 
grammatical interpretation of the clause would lead to a conclusion that if the FIU 
issues the freezing order the banks are fully exempted from liability. However, the 
author considers that this provision of the AML/CTF Law and the respective exemption 
also must be regarded through the prism of application of the principle of good faith. If 
the FIU adopts the freezing order on the basis of misleading or distorted information 
and documents received by the bank that although suggest suspicion of ML but have not 
been anyhow verified by the bank in limited occasions the exemption of liability can 
still be pierced. The same principle applies to the potential liability of the banks if they 
refrain from the transaction but the FIU order to stop from the refraining. 
In the process of this research, the author could not find any existing Latvian court 
practice regarding the customers’ claims against the banks for improper refraining from 
execution of the transactions by freezing their funds or about the State’s claim against 
the banks through a recourse claim under the AML/CTF Law regulation. However, 
likewise in the situation with unlawful closure of the customers’ accounts the courts will 
likely in future review this issue as the application of the AML regulation keeps 
intensifying within the banking sector. Again, the experience of foreign courts would be 
of useful assistance.  
A similar issue to this thesis topic has been reviewed by the Court of the United 
Kingdom in Shah v. HSBC Private Bank Ltd. Case
183
. Mr Shah, the customer of HSBC 
had instructed the bank to execute four transactions for approximately $38 million 
between September 2006 and February 2007 but the bank did not immediately execute 
the transactions because it suspected that they related to ML
184
. The bank made a 
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suspicious activity report to the Serious Organised Crime Agency and sought consent to 
proceed with the transactions, but the bank’s suspicions were later found to be false. 
Shah brought a claim for damages caused by the bank’s delay in executing the 
transactions. HSBC’s defence to Mr Shah’s claim was that it could not process the 
transactions because it suspected that they constituted ML. The Court of Appeal held 
that the burden is upon the reporting institution (the bank) to prove suspicion and that 
the bank may be required to do so at trial when sued by the relevant customer for failure 
to carry out a transaction while awaiting consent. This also entails that financial 
institutions will potentially be required to disclose how, when and from whom these 
suspicions originated
185
. The case does not alter the fact that the test for suspicion is low 
and therefore provided that the institution properly records its reasons for making the 
suspicious activity report, it is unlikely to incur liability
186
. 
4.5 Liability to customers vs. liability for breach of AML 
regulation 
The AML/CTF duties have put banks in a precarious position whereby they are required 
to obey the law by, among other obligations, reporting suspicious activities, the failure 
of which they may lead to their being prosecuted
187
. In Latvia FCMC has authority and 
mandate to carry out AML/CTF supervision of financial institutions. A wide range of 
administrative penalties, including but not limited to, monetary penalties and 
suspension/withdrawal of licence, and is available to FCMC in the case of non-
compliance with AML/CTF requirements. FCMC exercises its powers to impose the 
administrative penalties meeting the requirements of the 4
th
 EU AML Directive
188
. 
On the other hands banks risk civil litigation and claims for damages e.g., due to breach 
of contract/mandate if they fail to honour the instructions of their clients in relation to 
money in the account or terminate customer relationship with the client
189
. This 
potential dual liability of the banks raises an evident question –could facing a potential 
liability against their customers hinder the banks from enforcing the AML/CTF 
regulation? To assess this issue, a simplified comparison between the risk exposure of 
administrative fines for breach of AML regulation and customers’ claims for the 
statutory interest for delayed execution of transactions will now be performed. 
The research period for this purpose shall be 2014-2017. The author notes the financial 
assessment would be more accurate if the reference period would be longer (6 years – 10 years) 
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as it may take more than four years for the courts to declare the funds reported by the FIU to be 
proceeds of crime. However, it was not possible to review a longer period in this thesis as the 
earliest publicly available data is from 2014. For the future research a longer review period 
would be advisable. 
 The amount of funds frozen by the FIU during the period of 2014-2017
190
 is indicated 
in the following table: 
 
Source: Office for Prevention of Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity
191
 
The average amount of the funds frozen pursuant to the orders of the FIU during the 
period of 2014-2017 is 45,596,000.00 EUR. 
During the same period, the Latvian court adopted decisions on declaring funds to be 
proceeds of crime following information received from the FIU in the following 
amount: 
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Source: Office for Prevention of Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity
192
 
The average amount of the funds found to be the proceeds of crime, pursuant to the 
information received by the FIU during the period of 2014-2017, is 29,520,498.50 EUR.  
Thus, on average the FIU issues freezing orders for the amount that exceeds the sums 
the funds declared by the court to be proceeds from crime by 16,075,501.50 EUR per 
year. It can be established that these are the average sums that are improperly frozen by 
the FIU annual. Approximately 70% of all the suspicious and unusual transaction 
reports to the FIU are reported by banks
193
. Thus, it can be assumed that annually about 
11,252,851.10 EUR of the improperly frozen funds are related to the reports of the 
banks
194
. If the improper freezing of all these funds by the FIU would be the direct 
consequence of the banks’ improper application of the AML reporting measures, the 
banks could theoretically be held liable for the losses related to their freezing (the 
maximum amount attributable to banks). 
If the clients are unable to use the funds in their accounts, they may claim the statutory 
interest from the amount of the frozen assets for a delay of performance of the payment 
obligations. Pursuant to Article 1765 (1) of the Civil Law the annual statutory interest 
rate is 6%. 
Generally, the maximum period of the freezing of funds for which liability may be 
attributable to the banks due to their misleading suspicious/unusual transaction report 
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related to ML is 85 days. This period is comprised of the temporary freezing order of 
the FIU following the suspicious/unusual transaction report related and the order to 
freeze the funds for 45 days under Article 32.
2
 (2) 1) b) (the decision must be adopted 
within 40 days after the banks have submitted the suspicious/unusual transaction report 
related). 
The maximum risk exposure potential claims for the statutory interest for delayed 
payments if a freezing order has been issued by the FIU due to misleading 
suspicious/unusual transaction report related to ML is calculated in the following way: 
R = (A * Rst)/Y) * D, 
Where: 
R – the annual risk exposure 
A – amount of improperly frozen assets 
Rst – Statutory interest rate 
Y- days in the respective year 
D – Maximum of days for attributability of liability 
Thus, the maximum exposure to potential claims for the statutory interest for delayed 
payments if a freezing order has been issued by the FIU due to misleading 
suspicious/unusual transaction report related to ML is on average 157,231.62 EUR 
annually
195
. 
This risk exposure estimation does not include other potential claims for damages that 
are related to the freezing of the customers’ funds like contractual penalties that are 
imposed on the customers’ for failure to honour their payment obligations with their 
business partners. However, it is nearly impossible to make those calculations due to the 
unavailability of data. Further, The estimate does not include the claims for statutory 
interest for the funds that the banks freeze pursuant to their own initiative but in respect 
of which the FIU does not adopt the freezing order. Hence, the risk exposure for claims 
for statutory interest in practice may be even higher. On the other hand, these other  
potential claims for statutory interest would likely be for significantly lower amounts, as 
the maximum period of exposure for such conduct is only 8 business days until the FIU 
adopts the decision to stop refraining from executing the transaction pursuant to Article 
32.
2 
(1) of the AML/CTF Law
196
.  
The estimated risk exposure will now be compared to the administrative fines imposed 
on the banks for failure to properly apply the AML obligations
197
. In the period 2014-
2017, the FCMC imposed administrative fines to the banks and their management for 
failure to properly apply the AML obligations in the following amounts: 
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Source: The Financial and Capital Market Commission
198
 
The average annual amount of the fines during the reference period was 3,195,809.50 
EUR. The amount of fines has also increased substantially after 2014. In the future, the 
administrative fines for breaches of AML regulation can be even materially higher as 
pursuant to the 26 October 2017 amendments to the AML/CTF law introducing the 
requirements of the 4th EU AML directive the maximum amount of fines is 10% of the 
consolidated annual turnover of the bank. 
The difference between the estimated risk exposure for the customers’ claims for 
statutory payment and the fines imposed to the banks is more than 20 times.  Thus, it 
can be concluded that in terms of potential negative financial consequences, the banks 
are exposed to a materially higher risk of being held administratively liable than being 
sued by the customers for collection of the statutory interest payments.  
The author considers that this difference properly reflects the aims of aims of the AML 
regulation and strikes an appropriate balance between the obligation of the banks to 
apply the AML regulation and the risk of being sued by the customers for doing so 
improperly. When applying the AML regulation, the banks primarily have to be 
concerned with compliance requirements that include reporting the suspicious activities 
of their customers to the FIU. The aim of the whole AML system would be severely 
jeopardized if, due to the potential claims of their customers the banks would be afraid 
to refrain from executing the customers’ transactions if the banks have suspicions 
regarding the potential ML. At the same time, the application of the restrictive AML 
measures that have significant negative effect on the customers must be applied in a 
prudent manner based of well-assessed decisions. To ensure such application the banks 
have to remain aware of the risks of potential claims of the clients. 
Litigation against the banks’ customers for improper AML/CTF application could be 
costly to the banks due to legal fees and reputation. However, these aspects will not 
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significantly affect the above-mentioned conclusions and calculations. The legal costs 
of the banks can potentially be recovered by the opposing party in the civil dispute
199
 
and the reputational risks of the banks would be affected both in the litigation against 
the customer and failure to comply with the AML/CTL obligations, the latter arguably 
damaging the reputation of the bank much more significantly. 
In this Chapter, it has been established that although there is a general exemption of 
civil liability for application of AML measures provided in the AML regulation, the 
banks are still not entitled to apply the restrictive measures arbitrarily. When the banks 
apply the restrictive AML measures, they are obliged, pursuant to the principle of good 
faith, to gather sufficient evidence and information to form a reasonable suspicion, 
otherwise they risk not being covered by the exemption of liability and being held liable 
for the improper application of the law vis-à-vis its customer.  
In the following Chapter, the central procedural aspect regarding the customers’ 
potential claims will be explored - the distribution of burden of proof between the 
parties.  
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5. ANALYSIS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF  
As was noted in the previous Chapter of the thesis in the UK case Shah v. HSBC 
Private Bank Ltd. Case
200
 the UK courts have concluded that a bank has a burden of 
proof to prove suspicion of ML when sued by the relevant customer.  If the matter of 
the banks’ potential liability was reviewed by the Latvian courts the issue of the burden 
of proof of the banks’ suspicion likewise in the Shah v. HSBC Private Bank Ltd. case 
would be one of the central ones.  
Therefore, in this Chapter the distribution of the burden of proof between the parties in 
the civil disputes regarding liability of banks for improper application of restrictive 
AML measures will be examined. The question of whether and to what extent the banks 
have a burden of proof to prove their suspicions will also be discussed. And finally, it 
will be examined whether the burden of proof varies from the category of the customer 
of the banks - a regular customer, a subject of the AML/CTF Law, or the competitor of 
the bank. 
5.1 General rules for burden of proof 
As has been shown in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the banks are generally exempted from 
liability if they reasonably suspect that the customer might be involved in ML and in 
good faith apply some restrictive measures. However, it has also been shown that the 
exemption is not absolute and can be challenged by third parties.  
Article 93 of the Civil Procedure Law states that each party must prove the facts upon 
which they base their claims or objections. Plaintiffs must prove that their claims are 
well founded. Respondents must prove that their objections are well founded. Evidence 
must be submitted by the parties and by other participants in the case. In civil claims for 
damages against the banks for inappropriate application of the AML/CTF regulation 
typically the (potential) customers will be the plaintiffs and the banks will be the 
respondents. 
The distribution of the burden of proof between the litigants is based on the principle ei 
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (The burden of the proof lies upon him who 
affirms not he who denies). Thus, the onus probandi (burden of proof) initially lies with 
the plaintiff that brings a claim to court. Until the plaintiff has proven their claim the 
respondent does not have to prove anything and can deny the claim without any 
evidence
201
. 
Pursuant to basic legal doctrine of the Latvian civil procedure law established by Prof. 
Vladimirs Bukovskis in claims for damages, the burden of proof is distributed in the 
following way. The plaintiff must prove 1) the infringement of rights that has caused 
losses has indeed taken place; 2) the amount of losses inflicted by the infringement of 
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rights (passive basis of the claim)
202
. If the claimant argues that the respondent acted 
with malicious intent, the claimant must prove this allegation. If the claimant has 
successfully proven the said facts the respondent must prove that fault for the 
infringement of rights is not attributable to respondent. If the claimant has proven that 
the respondent has acted with malicious intent, the respondent can prevent the negative 
consequences by proving that the claimant has acted with a malicious intent as well
203
. 
It can be derived from the legal provisions that depending on the circumstances not only 
specific facts, but also rights and certain circumstances – defects of will, intent etc. must 
be proven
204
. These arguments and evidence can be, for instance, the lack of any 
questions from the bank regarding the origin of the customers’ assets or ignoring the 
information provided by the customer in the customer due diligence process. 
Neither the Civil Procedure Law, nor the AML/CTF Law expressly provide for 
provisions regarding the level of proof (evidence) that certain categories of the banks’ 
customers would have to reach to show that the bank may have breached the good faith. 
The law is also silent regarding the level of evidence for the bank to prove to the 
contrary.  However, the central criteria in evaluation of evidence is the assessment of its 
credibility, “which is to be understood as determination of the compliance of the 
evidence with the objective reality and factual circumstances”205. The court’s 
confidence in the credibility of the evidence must be sufficient, i.e. this confidence 
cannot be based on the possibility of the truthfulness of the evidence, disregarding the 
doubts
206
.   The norms of the Civil Procedure law do not bind the court with  formalistic 
criteria for the evaluation of evidence, but obliges it to motivate its conduct in assessing 
the evidence in the judgment
207
. 
Thus, in a claim for damages against the banks, the customer would have to prove that 
there are legal grounds for reimbursement of losses, namely: 1) unlawful activity of the 
bank – inappropriate application of the AML regulation; 2) the customer has incurred 
losses in a certain amount; 3) there is causal link between the conduct of the bank and 
the losses incurred
208
. If one of the litigants refers to a breach of the good faith and the 
other party denies it the accuser must prove the allegation
209
. To prove the unlawful 
activity, the customer also must provide arguments based on at least some objective 
evidence regarding the bad faith of the bank in application of the bank to prevent the 
exemptions of the bank’s liability.  
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The author considers that the customers do not have to prove the “negative fact” that 
they have no connection to ML and there could have been no well-grounded suspicion 
for the bank to have it. Only the bank can prove that they had a well-grounded suspicion 
about the client’s involvement in ML. However, the author agrees that this approach is 
somewhat inconsistent with the principle of ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui 
negat and it can be argued that the bank may abstain from filing any evidence regarding 
its suspicions until the claimant has submitted enough evidence indicating a case for the 
lack of good faith in the bank’s conduct. 
The burden of proof (rebuttal) shifts to the respondent only when the claimant has 
proven its claim. The claimant cannot rely on a rationale – “I cannot prove grounds of 
my claim, therefore the respondent must prove its objections” 210. In the context of civil 
liability, the person that wants to be exempted from the obligation to pay damages must 
prove that the infringement of the rights has taken place without its fault
211
.  
If the customer has proven the requirements for establishing the civil liability the onus 
probandi would shift to the bank. The bank can provide evidence that the prerequisites 
for civil liability have not been met. It can also re-invoke its exemption of liability if it 
provides evidence that it acted in good faith in applying the AML measures, i.e. there 
were reasonable grounds and sufficient evidence for suspicion that the customer may 
have been engaged in ML.  
On the other hand, it is correct that at the moment of the application of the restrictive 
AML regulation, the banks do not have all the information resources that are available 
e.g., to the FIU. The aim of the AML regulation, as discussed in the first Chapter of this 
thesis, would be severely jeopardized if it would be required for the banks to undergo 
universal investigation and gathering massive evidence before, e.g. refraining from the 
execution of the transaction and reporting the transaction to the FIU. The position of the 
author is that the banks must have sufficient evidence for suspicion before applying the 
measures in accordance with the good faith principle. The threshold for such 
“sufficiency” is low, however, it may not be non-existent. It may also vary between 
some categories of customers, as will be argued in the next chapters.  
Suspicion is defined as a possibility that is more than fanciful concerning the relevant 
facts
212
. A vague feeling of unease is insufficient. The onus is on financial institutions to 
prove the held suspicion. They will, potentially, be required to show the basis of their 
suspicion
213
. Proving the suspicion in court can be costly to the bank in terms of legal 
fees and reputation
214
. Given the burden of proof, the reporting process needs to be 
designed carefully. The reporting process must prevent situations, where one individual 
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employee acts out of bad faith, and ensure the wider spread of employees involved in 
the reporting process. In large financial institutions, it is easier to accomplish due to a 
large staff turnover. Meanwhile, this task becomes more challenging in smaller financial 
institutions
215
.  
In this regard the burden of proof of the banks would be similar to that which the banks 
have in their relationships with the FCMC pursuant to Regulation Regarding Enhanced 
Customer Due Diligence
216
 for credit institutions and electronic payment institutions, 
namely, to show that AML measures taken by the bank have been taken properly and 
correspond to the risk related to the relationship with the client.  
5.2 Different categories of customers 
The author considers that the credibility of evidence for proving the or bad faith and 
suspicions of the bank in application of the AML obligations varies depending on the 
status of the counter party in the transaction with the bank. Such an approach does not 
infringe the principle of equality provided in the first sentence of Article 91 of 
Satversme. The Constitutional Court of Latvia has established the objective of the 
principle of equality is to ensure that such requirement of the rule of law is observed if 
the law is applied without any privileges
217
.  
At the same time the principle of equality allows and even requires different treatment 
of persons that are in different circumstances, as well as allows different treatment of 
persons in the same circumstances, if there are objective and reasonable grounds for 
this
218
. The different categories of the banks’ customers involve different ML risks and 
the moral hazard of the banks to worsen their condition. Hence, the different types of 
customers are not in the same circumstances and differences in burden of proof for good 
faith does not trigger infringement of the principle of equality. 
5.2.1 Regular customers 
For the purposes of this thesis, both natural persons and private entities fall within this 
category of the banks’ customers, unless they are characterized by other criteria 
described in the following sub-sections. 
Typically, the banks are not inherently interested in applying the specifically stricter 
AML measures towards the regular customers if they do not represent additional ML 
risk (geographic risk, product risk, politically exposed persons etc.). Having more 
customers is in the banks’ commercial interest from a financial perspective. Natural 
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persons are generally consumers in the relationship with the banks, unless they enter 
into the relationship within the scope of their commercial or professional activity
219
. 
The banks must ensure that they do not breach the prohibition of the unfair commercial 
practice provided in the Unfair Commercial Practices Prohibition Law
220
. Commercial 
practice is unfair if it inter alia does not conform to professional diligence and has a 
substantial negative effect or may have a substantial negative effect on the economic 
actions of such average consumer or an average representative of such group of 
consumers in relation to goods or services, to whom the commercial practice is 
addressed or whom it concerns
221
. 
The author considers that the assessment of the banks’ good faith criteria in the civil 
proceedings against their regular customers can be regarded through the prism of the 
expected “professional diligence”. It can be expected from any professionally diligent 
financial market participant that their decisions, especially in application of restrictive 
measures, are well grounded and based on objectively assessed evidence. Therefore, the 
banks’ decision to apply the restrictive AML measures vis-a-vis their customers must 
not arbitrary and must be rooted in a diligent application of the risk-based approach. As 
argued above, it is the banks’ customers that must provide at least some reasoning for 
raising the suspicion that the banks have failed in its duties of diligence. If the 
customers suspect that the bank has failed to act with sufficient diligence, the customers 
are entitled to request the bank to submit evidence to the court based on which the 
decision to apply the restrictive measure was based.  
Therefore, in terms of assessing whether the bank failed to act in good faith in applying 
the AML measures, the level for burden of proof is the higher for the regular customers 
in comparison with other categories of customers described below. It means that it 
would be harder for them to prove the lack of good faith in the banks’ conduct and vice 
versa, it would be easier for banks to prove their good faith and reasonable suspicion 
regarding the regular customers. 
5.2.2 Subjects of AML regulation 
The subjects of the AML regulation are listed in Article 3 (1) of the AML/CTF Law. In 
the AML setting, subjects of the AML laws are gatekeepers-turned-police, required to 
detect, monitor and report suspicions of ML, but are viewed also as possible facilitators 
or enablers that can be deterred or punished through criminalisation
222
. The legislator 
has tasked these professions and institutions with AML obligations as they operate in 
areas and deal with customers that might represent a significant ML risk. On the other 
hand, the subjects of the AML are more aware of the general ML risks as they are 
obliged to comply with the AML regulation and introduce risk-mitigating measures in 
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their business. Thus, the author considers that the status of the subjects of the 
AML/CTF Law per se does not significantly affect the level for burden of proof of the 
banks’ good faith or the lack of it. In the claims against the banks for improper 
application of the AML measures, the level of the burden of proof is similar to that of 
the regular customers of the banks. 
In one of its judgments that concerned the AML/CTF Law, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that companies that are engaged in currency exchange business and credit 
institutions that provide the currency exchange as one of the financial services upon 
provision of these services, are to be considered as being in equal and comparable 
conditions with the banks according to specific criteria
223
. Based on this initial 
conclusion the Constitutional Court went on to make a conclusion that imposition of 
additional AML/CTF measures on the currency exchange companies by the Central 
Bank that are not applicable to banks and violates the principle of equality and is 
therefore unconstitutional. Even though this judgment was based on an inappropriate 
delegation of legislative powers from the legislator to the Bank of Latvia, it can be 
concluded that in certain situation the different subjects of AML/CTF Law can be 
considered as being in comparable situations that require equal treatment. Accordingly, 
in the potential claims against the banks, the level of the burden of proof of the subjects 
of the AML regulation would be similar, unless they also qualify under the category of 
the banks’ competitors reviewed below. 
5.2.3 Competitors of banks 
Banks are subject to competition laws and regulation, in particular the prohibition on 
anticompetitive agreements and abuse of market power. Article 18 of the Latvian 
Competition law prohibits unfair competition, which is defined in the following way: 
“[a]ctions, as the result of which laws and regulations or fair commercial 
practices are infringed, and which have created or could create a 
hindrance, restriction or distortion of competition, shall be deemed to be 
unfair competition”. 
Therefore, banks must be mindful of competition law requirements when applying the 
AML measures e.g. by deciding to terminate existing client relationships or decline new 
relationships. When applying the AML rules banks must ascertain that their AML 
policies and decisions to report a suspicious transaction, or deal or not to deal with 
certain customers, withdraw from particular type of business, and criteria used in 
assessing risks are determined individually and without coordination, and/or 
information exchange with other competitors. 
De-risking can be the result of various drivers, such as concerns about profitability, 
prudential requirements, anxiety after the global financial crisis, and reputational risk. It 
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is a misconception to characterise de-risking exclusively as an AML issue
224
. Limitation 
of competition by e.g. closing the accounts of the banks’ competitors (e.g. non – 
banking lenders) can be a driver of the bank to apply the restrictive measures. The same 
rationale also applies to other restrictive measures that can cause losses to the 
competitors, like freezing their accounts opened with the bank. 
Application of the restrictive AML measures against the competitors involves an 
inherently increased moral hazard and risk of acting in bad faith to hurt the competitor. 
Thus, the level of burden of proof for proving the good faith in application of the AML 
restrictive measures is the highest in comparison to other categories of customers of the 
bank. When assessing if the bank lacked good faith in applying the AML measures, the 
level for burden of proof is lower for the competitors and vice versa, it would be harder 
for banks to prove their good faith and suspicion regarding their competitors relative to 
other categories of customers. 
If a bank has such high market power that it can be considered as having dominant 
position in the relevant market, it is especially exposed to potential liability for 
improper application of the AML restrictive measures e.g. termination of the legal 
relationship with its competitors. Article 102 (1) TFEU
225
 prohibits any abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial 
part of it in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Article 102 (2) TFEU 
inter alia specifies that the following abuse of being in a dominant position is 
prohibited: limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. It is important to note that 
in determination of whether the bank holds a dominant position, the assessment of the 
relevant product market is important, not just the Latvian banking market in general. 
The narrower definition of the product market, the easier it is to conclude that an 
undertaking is dominant under Article 102
226
. 
While the dominance does not itself imply any reproach, the undertaking nonetheless 
has a “special responsibility”, irrespective of the cause of that position. Therefore, the 
undertaking in a dominant position may be deprived of the right to adopt a course of 
conduct which is not itself abusive, and which would be objectionable if taken by a non-
dominant undertaking
227
. The Court of Justice of the European Union had already held 
in the United Brands case that the dominant firm cannot refuse to meet the orders of a 
longstanding customer who abides be regular commercial practice
228
. Refusal by the 
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dominant firm to supply existing customers will therefore be abusive unless there is 
some objective justification
229
.  
It is not under a discussion that application of AML/CTF measures is an objective 
justification to e.g. reject access to the banks’ services (on the contrary, it would be the 
obligation of the bank under the AML/CTF Law if the risk would become 
unmanageable).  However, considering the risks of abusing the market power the banks 
must make extra offer to record the decision-making process and review and store 
sufficient evidence for the application of the said measures. 
Therefore, the level of proof of good faith for banks being in a dominant position or at 
least having significant market power is even higher than that of the banks not 
exercising such market power.  
In this chapter, the distribution of the burden of proof between the parties in the civil 
disputes and between the banks and their customers was researched. It was established 
that in the event of a court dispute, in addition to providing the damages, the customers 
also have to provide arguments based on at least some objective evidence regarding the 
bad faith of the bank in the application of the bank to prevent the exemption of the 
bank’s liability. When the burden of proof shifts to the banks, they have to be able to 
provide objective and reasonable justification for application of the restrictive AML 
measures.  
It was also asserted in this chapter that the level for the burden of proof of the 
“reasonability” of the banks’ suspicion may vary from the category of the customer. 
When assessing if the bank lacked good faith in applying the AML measures, the level 
for the burden of proof is lower for the competitors of the banks in comparison with 
other categories of customers.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis of the thesis was that the banks could have civil liability vis-à-vis their 
customers if the banks have failed to properly apply the restrictive AML measures and 
the potential remedies of customers go beyond the framework set by the AML/CTF 
Law. The hypothesis of the thesis was confirmed during the research. 
It was concluded that if the banks fail to acquire sufficient evidence to substantiate their 
suspicion regarding the customers’ involvement in ML, they risk being held liable for 
improper application of the law vis-à-vis their customers. The primary type of the civil 
liability is the claim for damages, but in specific circumstances other remedies like 
contractual penalties also might become available to the customers. 
It was concluded that the AML/CTF Law only lists circumstances that allow the 
aggrieved customer to claim compensation for losses under the specific procedure 
provided in the AML/CTF Law. However, it does not limit any other potential claims of 
the aggrieved persons not explicitly covered by the AML/CTF Law. The customers of 
banks can bring such claims under the Civil Procedure Law directly against the banks 
that improperly applied the AML obligations. The author considers that this conclusion 
must be explicitly provided in the AML/CTF Law to prevent misconception in future. 
In this regard in the thesis the author suggests introducing specific amendments to the 
AML/CTF Law proposed in Chapter 3.2 of the thesis. 
It is argued in the thesis that the distinction in the AML/CTF Law between the banks’ 
“unjustified” and “unlawful” in application of the AML measures, in respect of the 
potential liability, is artificial and unnecessarily confusing. The primary criterion for 
triggering the banks’ liability is the assessment if the bank applied the restrictive 
measures if good faith. Hence, the author suggests reworking the regulation under 
Chapter XIV AML/CTF Law, without the distinction of the two notions and subjecting 
the potential recourse claim on the faith in which the subject of the Law acted in 
application of the restrictive measures.  
The research question of the thesis was to determine whether restrictive AML measures 
applied by the banks towards their customers can be arbitrary or they need to be based 
on objective evidence and for the exemption of liability to apply.  It was concluded that 
application of the restrictive AML measures must be reasonably assessed. Enforcement 
of the AML regulation by the banks must not be arbitrary and it must be justified by 
sufficient evidence and rooted in a diligent application of the risk-based approach and 
the principle of good faith. Unfounded doubts of the banks of the customers’ 
involvement in ML do not represent sufficient grounds to apply the restrictive measures, 
as the doubts have to be well grounded, i.e., there must be specific factual circumstances 
that indicate the connection of the customer to ML.  
Thus, the banks are not entitled to arbitrarily terminate the contractual relationship with 
the customers by simply invoking the unilateral termination clause in the contract based 
on a hypothetical ML risk. Neither are they allowed to arbitrarily and without 
reasonable evidence deny a transaction to and from the customers’ accounts. 
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On the other hand, the aim of the AML regulation would be jeopardized if it would be 
required for the banks to undergo universal investigation and gathering massive 
evidence before applying the restrictive measures. As regulation does not prescribe for 
the threshold of profoundness for evidence, it was concluded that the evidence has to be 
reasonably well grounded, so that an average expert in the AML field would objectively 
arrive at the same conclusion on the suspiciousness of the transaction. The threshold for 
such “sufficiency” is low, but it may not be non-existent. 
In respect of the distribution of the burden of proof in the customers’ civil claims 
against the banks, the customers do not have to prove the “negative fact” that they have 
no connection to ML and there could have been no grounded suspicion of the bank 
regarding it. Only the bank can prove that they had a well-grounded suspicion about the 
client’s involvement in ML, therefore the burden of proof would be on the bank to 
prove this suspicion. 
Furthermore, the credibility of evidence for proving the good or bad faith and 
suspicions of the bank in application of the AML obligations varies depending on the 
status of the counter party in the transaction with the bank. When assessing if the bank 
acted in good faith in applying the AML measures the level for burden of proof of the 
banks is the higher regarding for their competitors in comparison with other categories 
of customers. This is especially relevant if the bank has a dominant position in the 
relevant market. Considering the risks of abusing the market power the banks must 
make extra offer to record the decision-making process and review and store sufficient 
evidence for the application of the restrictive measures.  
Although the Latvian courts are yet to face claims of the customers against the banks for 
improper application of AML regulation, customers of banks in other countries have 
already tried bringing such claims in their national courts. The outcome has generally 
not been splendid from the customers’ perspective, however, in some instances their 
arguments have met at least partial recognition of the court. The scarce case law of other 
countries suggests that the banks may have the obligation to prove their suspicions if 
sued by their customers. These findings of the courts of other countries may also be 
useful in potential disputes before the Latvian courts. 
The Latvian banks recently have faced ever-increasing AML obligation, which has led 
to more rigorous application of the AML measures. The banks are presently undergoing 
massive cutting of their customers, especially non-residents. Loosening the grip on 
refraining of execution of the customers’ transactions is also not to be expected in a 
foreseeable future. Thus, the author considers that it is just a matter of time until the 
customers will in practice start bringing claims against the banks when they feel that 
their interests have been encroached upon without merit.  
The findings and conclusions of this thesis will be relevant in Latvia from both the point 
of view of theoretical analysis and practical applicability. The author hopes that in 
regard of the academic perspective the thesis might serve as a starting point for an 
academic discussion of the nearly void topic of the liability of banks for improper 
application of the AML regulation towards their customers. From the practical 
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perspective the practitioners might use the conclusions of the thesis in the upcoming 
disputes between the banks and the customers. 
The conclusions of the thesis suggest that the principle of the banks’ exemption for 
improper application of the AML obligations vis-à-vis their customers is not as 
universal as the grammatical interpretation of the international AML regulation and the 
wording of the AML/CTF Law may suggest. The author is aware that this narrower 
interpretation of the exemption of liability may facing fierce opposition and dissenting 
opinions arguing that the narrow interpretation of the exemption of liability may 
jeopardize achieving the general aims of the AML system as the banks may be afraid of 
imposing the restrictive measures in fear of being sued by the customers. However, the 
simplified financial analysis provided in Chapter 4.5 suggests that in terms of potential 
negative financial consequences, the banks are exposed to a materially higher risk of 
being held administratively liable for failure to impose the restrictive measures than 
being sued by the customers. 
By this thesis the author by no means undermines the importance and necessity for a 
strict application of the AML measures by the Latvian banks, which is a cornerstone for 
a modern, effective and reputable financial system. However, at the same time the 
application of these measures that have significant negative effect on the customers 
must be applied in a prudent manner based of well-assessed decisions. The thesis 
suggests that if it becomes evident that the banks have failed to act in this manner the 
customers might consider pursuing the difficult but not impossible task to hold the 
banks liable. 
Regarding the potential fields for further research, it may be relevant to explore whether 
the current compensation mechanism under the AML/CTF Law that the state primarily 
compensates the losses to the customers, and then has a right to bring recourse claims 
against the banks, is the optimal one and meets the requirements of procedural 
efficiency. Furthermore, it would also be significant to research whether the maximum 
liability limits provided in the AML/CTF Law comply with the constitutional right of 
the aggrieved person to receive an adequate compensation for the inflicted harm. Such 
research on the compensation mechanism and the constitutionality of the limitation of 
liability, in light of conclusions of this thesis, would be a challenging topic worth 
exploring in a PhD thesis.  
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